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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
Description of the Study 
 
 In this study, I examine the chronological development of a “common” 
European immigration policy and evolution of the Spanish immigration laws and 
the regularization programs with respect to illegal immigration and external 
border controls. By referring to a “common” policy, I point to an envisioned goal 
of creating a unified immigration policy, which has not yet culminated with final 
process of the supranationalization
1
 of national policies. Thus, (the development 
of) a “common” immigration policy is synonymous with a pathway to the 
prospective, but still questionable, communitarization of national immigration 
laws.  
 After the chronological evolution of policies/laws at both the EU and 
national levels, I analyze the initiation of the harmonization in the mid-1980s 
within the lines of neofunctionalism and, from there on, the ongoing process of 
the communitarization of migration policies within the lines of supranationalism. 
Furthermore, I apply (liberal)
2
 intergovernmentalism to the case study of Spain. I 
finally scrutinize how each of the analytical frameworks has played out in two-tier 
processes:  1) gradual empowerment of the EU institutions through official 
treaties, summits and programs; and 2) role of a member state in the 
communitarization of immigration policies. 
                                                 
1
 In this context, supranationalization refers to an ultimate integration of policies, which then fall 
under day-to-day processes of policymaking at the EU level. 
2
 I leave the word “liberal” in parenthesis because I reference both intergovernmentalism and its 
offshoot, liberal intergovernmentalism.  
2 
Background 
 Negotiations for European integration
3
 began almost immediately after 
World War II and resulted in the Treaty of Paris of 1951, which established the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The main objectives of this 
historical document embodied the incremental, special-purpose economic 
integration of the signatory countries.
4
 Many politicians envisioned the ECSC and 
the European Economic Community (EEC) of 1958 as building blocks of a full-
fledged economic cooperation. Subsequently, the European Community
5
 began to 
experience gradual socio-political integration, which over time has been 
legitimizing this phenomenal and historic European project. The Treaty of 
European Union of 1993 (TEU) represented a new stage of integration by opening 
a way to political unity. Initially, the member states had not anticipated 
integration of policy areas such as gender equality or environmental protection. 
Likewise, the highly contested topic of immigration has been the source of 
resentment and skepticism among national governments since an early attempt to 
“communitarize” migration policies in the 1980s. Completion of the ongoing 
initiative would empower the EU central institutions with decision-making and 
policymaking initiatives in a policy area that has long been regarded as too 
closely linked to the issue of sovereignty, hence too difficult to “communitarize.”  
 The ongoing European debate on unification of national immigration 
policies has now a very long history. The harmonization of the migratory regime 
                                                 
3
 European integration refers to a transfer of policymaking power from the national to the 
supranational level. 
4
 The signatory countries were France, West Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, 
and Italy.  
 
3 
for EU citizens and legal residents commenced in the 1980s with the Schengen 
Agreements of 1985 and the Single European Act (SEA) of 1987. Ever since, the 
process of the development of a “common” immigration policy has faced 
stagnation; some of the many member states have treated immigration issues as an 
essential part of their national sovereignty. Regardless of the observable 
stagnation, the “common” immigration policy rhetoric found outlets for gradual 
evolution. The nation states have progressively pooled and delegated their 
decision making to the EU institutions: the European Commission, the European 
Parliament, and the European Court of Justice. We may assert that the recent 
Treaty of Lisbon also strengthened the fervent debate on the envisioned 
communitarization of immigration policies. 
A debate on a unified policy has been divided into several theoretical 
camps, including institutionalism and state-centrism. On the one hand, 
institutionalist theorists have emphasized the role of supranational institutions, the 
European Commission and the European Court of Justice, in directing the 
communitarization of national immigration policies. On the other hand, state-
centric theorists have accredited the role of national governments in deciding on 
the degree of pooling domestic policies, based on their national interests, 
preferences and expectations. At a first glimpse, the process of the development 
of a potential “common” immigration policy seems to align with institutionalist 
theories due to evident, gradual empowering of the EU institutions over time. 
However, many would argue that the member states have continued to be the 
driving force behind deepening integration, awarding the EU institutions with 
4 
control only minimally and seeing them as mere facilitators in state and inter-state 
decision-making processes. 
Importance of the Study 
 Generally, scholars of European integration argue that Germany, France 
and the United Kingdom have steered economic, political and social development 
of the European Union. Similar assumptions hold with regards to formation of a 
unified migration policy. However, countries of the South have in fact 
significantly contributed to the process of shaping the EU migration rhetoric, 
mainly due to their geographical proximity to North Africa and the Middle East. 
As I argue in this study, Spain is, in fact, a leader in the debate on the process of 
the development of a “common” immigration policy, especially in the realm of 
illegal immigration and external border control. Such an observation shows that 
not only Berlin, Paris and London dictate the nature of the harmonization of case-
sensitive policies. Spain‟s socio-economic upheavals, large influx of immigrants, 
and geopolitical proximity to North Africa have accredited Spain as an important 
player in the decision-making process. Thus, Spain‟s active advocacy for the 
communitarization of immigration policies has followed an intergovernmental 
pattern, emphasizing importance of this nation state‟s preferences. Significance of 
domestic interests has been noticeable in the Spanish regularization programs, 
which have run counter to EU restrictive objectives. 
Structure of the Study 
 The paper comprises six chapters which are divided in smaller 
subchapters. Following this introductory chapter, chapter two is a brief literature 
5 
review, where I introduce key scholars of: neofunctionalism, supranationalism, 
and (liberal) intergovernmentalism; the timing of European cooperation and the 
process of harmonization in the area of immigration policy; the EU‟s influence on 
Spanish policymaking; and Spain‟s impact on EU objectives. I also introduce my 
own theoretical position and contribution to these field studies. Subsequently, 
chapters three and four constitute chronological approaches to the “common” 
immigration policy development and the national immigration laws respectively. 
In the former section, I focus on the European Community/Union
6
 treaties, 
immigration policy-oriented summits, programs and other EU developments. In 
the latter chapter, I look at the Spanish immigration laws and the regularization 
programs, in addition to several national programs. I also outline possible 
rationales behind Spain‟s advocacy for a harmonized policy and its selective 
transposition of EU objectives.  
 Chapter five comprises applicability of theoretical frameworks. I examine 
neofunctionalist argumentation to the initiation of the harmonization process in 
the 1980s and relevance of supranationalism in the study of the “common” 
immigration policy development. I also incorporate an intergovernmentalist 
challenge to the discussed institutionalist theories. Furthermore, I look at liberal 
intergovernmentalism and its pertinence to Spain‟s role in the communitarization 
of immigration policies. Lastly, I scrutinize all theories and, based on my 
research, either negate or (partially) accept each of the theoretical frameworks. 
                                                 
6
 In my work, I will use the term European Community (EC), instead of the European Union (EU) 
when referencing to the EU before 1993. After that year, I will utilize the term European Union 
due to the name change during the Treaty of the European Union (1993). At times, I will also use 
the two abbreviations at once, i.e. EU/EC when seen as necessary. 
 
6 
Finally, chapter six outlines analytical conclusions and adds any relevant remarks 
to the study.  
Scope of the Study 
Due to the magnitude of the research topic, I introduce several parameters 
to it. For the purposes of the paper, my definition of immigration policies 
comprises illegal immigration, which is only one of the four politically defined 
categories of migration. Additionally, I take into consideration external border 
controls and legalization programs for illegal immigrants at a national level. I 
intend to study: the process of empowering of the EU institutions (through 
qualified majority voting in the European Council of Ministers and co-decision in 
the European Parliament) by the member states via the treaties, and the evolving 
nature of a “common” policy (restrictive or expansive). Thus, I mainly 
concentrate on the treaties, topic-specific summits, time-specific immigration 
programs, pacts and other migration- and external border-related establishments, 
which involve cooperation of the EU heads of government and state.  I do not 
focus on directives, regulations, and recommendations in the chapter on the 
process of the “common” immigration policy development. Nonetheless, the 
chapter on the Spanish immigration law and the regularization programs 
incorporates such law-binding legislations
7
 in order to trace the EU‟s impact on 
the country‟s national policies.  
It is crucial to mention that I do not cover the process of Europeanization, 
which is a second wave of scholarship after the European integration. 
                                                 
7
 Existing directives and regulations on immigration are a first step on a pathway to any unified 
policy. 
7 
Europeanization mainly defines a top-down process of a member state‟s 
adaptation to EU objectives. As referenced, the chapter on the evolution of the 
Spanish immigration law briefly refers to EU‟s influence on Spanish legislations. 
However, I do not need to apply a whole new theoretical approach to this 
relatively short section of the paper in order to define the role that the EU has 
played since the mid-1980s. My study focuses more on the bottom-up process 
between Spain and the EU institutions. 
Moreover, I introduce a modified version of liberal intergovernmentalism 
as an analytical tool. Unlike Andrew Moravcsik, a prominent 
intergovernmentalist scholar, I place emphasis on the electorate, whose influence 
is omitted in the process of international negotiations. As I introduce my 
hypothesis below, I am fully aware of the theory‟s limitations.  
 Another delimitation of my work is a focus on a single case study. Some 
may argue that research conclusions should not be based on sole examination of 
legal developments in one nation state. However, I intend to reach a conclusion 
about the Spanish immigration law development and to see what light it sheds on 
the intrgovernmentalist-supranationalist dichotomy, rather than to make claims 
that may be applicable across the 27 member states. I argue that liberal 
intergovernmentalism has, in fact, been one of the most important contributors to 
the study of European integration and students of the development of a “common” 
immigration policy have marked this theory as viable.
8
 
                                                 
8
For example see Finn Laursen, “Theory and Practice of Regional Integration,” Miami-Florida 
European Union Center of Excellence: Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series 8, no. 3 
(February 2008), http://www6.miami.edu/eucenter/LaursenLongSympos08RegIntegedi.pdf 




The examination of the Spanish immigration law and the regularization 
programs sheds light on socio-economic and political factors that have led to the 
amendment of immigration policies. It also unravels the Spanish government‟s 
relationship to a potential, evolving “common” immigration policy. Introduction 
of a case study allows us to get a deeper and fuller understanding of the 
harmonization of immigration policies and a role played by a particular member 
state in its process.  
 I use numerous data sources in this work. Due to the topic of my study, 
qualitative rather than quantitative data are more commonly presented. However, 
the latter is introduced when referring to particular official statistics related to a 
number of immigrants, for instance, who enter Spain and who are granted 
amnesties. My qualitative data collection has focused on: firstly, primary 
documents of the EU institutions in form of treaties, summits, time-framed 
programs, EU directives, and certain Commission communications; secondly, 
secondary sources such as relevant literature, books, doctorate and master‟s 
theses, scholarly journals and articles, both in print and online.   
My Anticipated Contribution 
 I intend to show that Spain has undoubtedly been a leader in the process of 
the “common” immigration policy development. Its active advocacy, which began 
in the 1990s, has placed Spain as one of few major voices in the non-monolithic 
process of shaping a “common” migration policy. By using the EU as an effective 
arena to resolve domestic issues, the Spanish governments (socialist and 
9 
conservative) have been able to project their ideas and concepts, especially in the 
realm of security concerns with illegal immigration, to the EU level. The 
country‟s geostrategic location has allowed it to edge out as a powerful state, 
which sits behind drafting of a unified policy among other decision-making 
countries, such as Germany, France, the Netherlands and Belgium. Such an 
observation leads to an argument that Spain‟s lobbying power exerts decisive 
influence on the policymaking process. Hence my coined term, 
“intergovernmentalist supranationalization,” I argue that intergovernmentalism 
has been the means of reaching the envisioned supranationalist end, thus showing 
that nation states have continued to play a major role in defining a common 
approach to certain policies at the EU level.  
Hypothesis 
In the process of developing a “common” immigration policy, countries 
have gradually pooled and delegated decision-making process over illegal 
immigration and border controls. A case study of Spain supports (liberal) 
intergovernmentalism as a process of achieving a supranational migration regime 
and thus reflecting “intergovernmentalist supranationalization.” Spain‟s well-
pronounced political and socio-economic interests that relate to immigration 
ultimately shape EU objectives. The EU member state has been one of the 
leaders, rather than laggards, in the process of drafting a “common” immigration 













 Theoretical assumptions by prominent scholars of early neofunctionalism, 
Ernst Haas and Leon Lindberg, are of particular relevance to the study of regional 
integration. In the late 1950s, Haas describes Western Europe as a “living 
laboratory” for the study of collective action between European states.
9
 He 
foresees that the European project would culminate as an economic and political 
community through the process of European integration. Haas defines political 
integration as  
the process whereby political actors in several distinct national 
settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and 
political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess 
or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states. The 
end result of process of political integration is a new political 




Lindberg builds on Haas‟ theory. He observes the process of integration with a 
particular caution. According to him, political integration is 
                                                 
9
 Laura Cram, “Integration Theory and the Study of the European Policy Process,” in European 
Union: Power and Policy-making, ed. Jeremy Richardson (London: Routledge, 2001), 55. 
10
 Ernst Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950-1957 (London: 
Stevens, 1958), 16. 
For more on neofunctionalist approach to European integration, see Ernst Haas and Philippe 
Schmitter, “Economic and Differential Patterns of Political Integration: Projections about Unity in 
Latin America,” International Organization, 18, no. 4 (Autumn 1964);  Ernst Haas, “The „Uniting 
of Europe‟ and the Uniting of Latin America,” Journal of Common Market Studies, 5 (June 1967);  
Philippe Schmitter, “Ernst B. Haas and the Legacy of Neofunctionalism,” Journal of European 
Public Policy 12, no. 2 (April 2005);  Ernst Haas, “The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections 
on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing,” in Regional Integration, ed. Leon Lindberg and Stuart 
Scheingold (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1971), 3-42. 
11 
(1) the process whereby nations forgo the desire and ability to 
conduct foreign and key domestic policies independently of each 
other, seeking instead to make joint decisions or to delegate the 
decision-making process to new central organs; and (2) the process 
whereby political actors in several distinct settings are persuaded 





Similarly to Haas, Lindberg perceives regional integration, particularly 
European integration, as a process rather than a condition. Both scholars see 
political integration as a result of economic integration, which is fueled by the 
logic of “spillover.” “Spillover” is noticeable when integration of one sector 
creates pressure, which then pushes states to integrate other sectors. This snowball 
effect has metamorphosed into three variants of “spillover:” functional, political 
and cultivated.
12
 Functional “spillover” refers to a process where harmonization in 
one segment of policymaking moves to cooperative activities in other sectors, 
which are closely linked to the former integrated sector.
13
 As Neill Nugent 
summarizes, political “spillover” describes the process, where: national elites
14
 
turn their attention to supranational levels of activity and decision making. They 
become favorably disposed toward the integration process and the upgrading of 
common interests. Subsequently, the supranational institutions and non-
governmental actors become more influential in the integration process, while the 
                                                 
11
 Leon N. Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1963), 6. 
12
 This three-layered distinction has not been originally defined by Haas or Lindberg, but adopted 
by other scholars; i.e. see Stephen George, Politics and Policy in the European Community 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985).  
13
 Cram, “Integration Theory,” 58. 
14
 Haas dealt almost exclusively with non-governmental elites, whereas Lindberg stressed the 
importance of governmental elites in the political “spill-over.”  
12 
nation states and governmental actors become less influential.
15
 Finally, cultivated 
“spillover” deals with the importance of the central institutions, strongly 
emphasized by both Haas and Lindberg in their findings.  
As Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen, a more contemporary neofunctionalist 
scholar, mentions, Haas and Lindberg assert that the central institutions serve as 
“midwives” for the integration process through embodying common interests of 
the member states.
16
 Tranholm-Mikkelsen concludes that the mechanisms of 
“spillover,” which reinvigorated the neofunctionalist theory in the 1980s (after the 
stagnation of European integration in the late 1960s and the 1970s), have made 




 The theory of supranationalism builds on the neofunctionalist approach, 
mainly because the latter view endorses supranational governance and serves as a 
mother theory to the former framework. Indisputably, Jean Monnet has been 
considered as one of the founding fathers of the European Community and an 
influential scholar in contributing to the theory of supranationalism. In his work 
titled A Ferment of Change (1962), the French civil servant and diplomat projects 
a necessity of European nation states to adopt common rules governing their 
behavior and create centralized institutions in order to avoid future continental 
conflicts. Nonetheless, Monnet does not refer to a centralized, federal-like 
government with exclusive powers. He perceives the process of integration as a 
                                                 
15
 Neill Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 1999), 507. 
16
 Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen, “Neofunctionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete?” Millennium: Journal 




means of creating a “supranationalized” unity of states with common institutions 
facilitating the process of decision making.
18
 
 Similarly, Rafael Leal-Arcas summarizes supranationalism as a system 
where the member states still have power, which is then shared with other actors. 
Since majority voting becomes the main decision-making mechanism, a member 
state with an opposing decision finds itself pushed by other actors to agree on a 
final outcome. Each nation state joins the European Union on voluntary basis, and 
thus may leave it anytime it desires.
19
 Although skeptics have often voiced fears 
of the loss of national sovereignty to the centralized institutions, the scholar 
correctly used the key term “voluntarism” in describing the European project.  
 Another renowned institutionalist scholar, Joseph Weiler, defines 
supranationalism as not merely a phenomenon “over and above individual 
states.”
20
 Drawing upon Haas and Monnet‟s definitions, Weiler accredits the 
presence of national governments as influential in and accountable for European 
integration. The scholar divides European integration into two processes: 
normative and decisional. The former type of supranationalism refers to a 
relationship between the Community policies and member states‟ competing 
policies.
21
 One can notice a hierarchical dichotomy between the European level 
and national level policies. Moreover, the decisional supranationalism constitutes 
                                                 
18
 Jean Monnet, “A Ferment of Change” in The European Union: Readings on the Theory and 
Practice of European Integration, ed. Brent F. Nelsen and Alexander C-G. Stubb (Boulder; 
London: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1994), 20. 
19
 Rafael Leal-Arcas, “Theories of Supranationalism in the EU,” Bepress Legal Series, paper 1790 
(2006): 5, http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=8481&context=expresso  (accessed 
August 5, 2009).   
20
 Joseph Weiler, “The Community System: the Dual Character of Supranationalism, Yearbook of 
European Law 1 (1981): 267. 
21
 Ibid., 271.  
14 
the political approach. It defines the way in which decision-making processes are 
executed at the European level.
22
 
 More contemporary theorists have attempted to emphasize the role played 
by the EU institutions and the presence of multi-level governance in the European 
Union. Wayne Sandholtz, a supranationalist successor of neofunctionalists, rejects 
the intergovernmental view of the EU as a bargaining forum for its member states. 
Sandholtz sees the EU institutions as powerhouses, sharing interests of the 
member states and defining paths of political influence.
23
 According to him, the 
central institutions have had a substantial dominance to influence political 
behavior of the actors. They have not only transformed into autonomous bodies, 
but also shaped opinions for the member states and introduced changes at the 
domestic level.
24
 Aligning with the original theory of supranationalism, Sandholtz 
sees the European Commission and the European Court of Justice as architects of 
compromises between the states. The scholar provides empirical evidence to 
underline the institutions‟ leading roles. He argues that the EU has in fact been 
capable of changing domestic policies by enmeshing in national politics. The 
member states may change their viewpoints as a result of the EU institutions‟ 
scope of influence over their decisions.
25
 Sandholtz claims that when there is a 
common policy that a member state dislikes, it is unlikely to withdraw because it 




 Wayne Sandholtz, “Membership Matters: Limits of the Functional Approach to European 
Institutions,” Journal of Common Market Studies 34, no. 3 (September 1996): 405. 
24
 Ibid.  
25
 Ibid., 426. 
15 





In contrast to the above institutionalist theories, Stanley Hoffman argues 
that nation-states are the basic units in world politics.
27
 While classical 
neofunctionalism has placed a passive role to the member states by focusing more 
on the EU institutions as powerhouses, Hoffman‟s intergovernmentalist critique 
emphasizes the role of national governments as promoters of the interests of the 
people.
28
 National governments have been more “obstinate” than “obsolete” in the 
process of European integration, thus challenging the snowball effect of 
cooperation proposed by neofunctionalists.
29
 According to Hoffman, diversity of 
national interests would set limits to “spillover” because national governments 
would not compensate their losses by gains in other areas.
30
 Additionally, “high 
politics” like foreign, security and defense policies, unlike “low politics” of 
economic and welfare policies, would be least likely to undergo political 
integration due to the high political salience.  
 Moreover, Hoffman‟s work analyzes the connotation of the phrase 
“upgrading the common interest.” Haas and Lindberg understand the creation of a 
political community through pooling common interests and “upgrading” them 
through supranational advocacy. However, Hoffman asserts that the common 




 Ben Rosamond, Theories of European Integration (New York: St. Martin‟s Press, 2000), 76. 
28




 Stanley Hoffman, “Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western 
Europe,” Daedalus  95, no. 2 (Spring 1966): 882. 
16 
interest is in reality an interest of a single nation state, most likely the most 
predominant one.
31
 The scholar raises a rhetorical question of what is truly the 
common interest. At the time of his writing, Hoffman states that the European 
Community is still in the realm of “strategic-diplomatic behavior” where rules of 
the game apply.
32
 Each country‟s interests reflect different concerns, favored by 
domestic incongruence. The envisioned political unification could have smoothly 





 Drawing on Hoffman‟s theory, Moravcsik develops a more pluralist 
theoretical framework, which he names liberal intergovernmentalism. His novel 
approach to the importance of state-centrism has received a great deal of attention 
since its emergence in the 1990s. Similarly to Hoffman‟s arguments, Moravcsik 
criticizes supranational dimensions of neofunctionalism.
34
 The scholar defines the 
European Union as a series of intergovernmental negotiations.
35
   
 Liberal intergovernmentalism is based on two assumptions about politics: 
the rationality of state behavior and states‟ role as actors. The assumption that 
states are rational is a basic aspect of the theory. Moravcsik and Paul 
                                                 
31
 Stanley Hoffman, “Discord in Community: The North Atlantic Area as a Partial International 
System,” International Organization 17, no.3 (Summer 1963): 527. 
32
 Ibid.  
33
 Hoffman, “Obstinate or Obsolete?” 863. 
34
 Steve Smith, “International Theory: European Integration,” in International Relations Theory 
and the Politics of European Integration, ed. Morten Kelstrup and Michael C. Williams (London: 
Routledge, 2000): 45. 
35
 Andrew Moravcsik, “Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal 
Intergovernmentalist Approach,” Journal of Common Market Studies 31, no.4 (December, 1993): 
473. 
17 
Schimmelfenning argue that states are actors in the world of politics.
 36
 Countries 
have been capable of achieving goals through intergovernmental negotiations and 
bargaining, rather than through a central authority in charge of making and 
enforcing decisions.
37
 They have also continued to enjoy decision-making power 
and political legitimacy, even when being members of the European entity. 
Moreover, the liberal intergovernmentalist framework focuses on three 
fundamental phases of negotiations:  national preference formation, interstate 
bargaining, and institutional choice.
38
 The liberal theory of national preferences 
applies the theory of international relations and focuses on the state-society 
relations in shaping domestic preferences. Private individuals, voluntary 
associations, civil society, and et cetera have lobbied national governments and 
formulated choices and desires of the nation states. Their interests are articulated 
and pushed forward. Governments then determine preferences based on these 
domestic groups. Certain sub-groups within the interest domestic groups have a 
multitude of benefits to gain or lose in a certain policy. Therefore these lobbyists 
may become the most viable ones in the formation of preferences.
39
 
 Furthermore, the interstate negotiations are embedded in a bargaining 
theory of international cooperation. The latter theory indicates that the outcome of 
international negotiations depends on the relative bargaining power of the 
actors.
40
 The interstate bargain outcomes are conclusively shaped by the nation 
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states, whose powers collide asymmetrically. In his book, Moravcsik portrays 
how intensive bargaining may create threats of veto proposals, withholding of 
financial side-payments, or alternative alliance formations.
41
 Also, if one nation 
state depends more on a given agreement, it will be more prone to compromise in 
order to achieve envisioned goals. 
 Institutional choice includes a dilemma of pooling and delegation of 
sovereignty, which encompasses qualified majority voting and ceding of decision-
making powers to the supranational institutions. Basing their argument on 
neoliberal institutionalism developed by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye,
42
 
Moravcsik and Schimmelfenning argue that international institutions are in fact 
necessary for durable international cooperation. Pooling and delegation of 
authority to the EU institutions helps the nation states to reach a superior outcome 
by reducing the transaction costs. Additionally, domestic actors who benefit from 




The Timing of European Cooperation in the Area of Immigration Policy 
 With regards to initiation of the cooperation in the 1980s, institutionalist 
scholars point to the “spillover” mechanism, whereas state-centric scholars have 
underlined a rather intergovernmental pattern. In their descriptive chapter on the 
theory of neofunctionalism, Arne Niemann and Philippe C. Schmitter examine 
likely cases for the “spillover” conditions. According to their evaluation, internal 
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market “spilled over” to the area of Justice and Home Affairs. If the Single 
Market was to be completed, certain measures were necessary in areas of visa, 
asylum, immigration and police cooperation.
44
 Moreover, David Mutimer adds 
that abolition of physical barriers and border controls by the Single Market 
facilitated free movement of people. According to him, dismantling of internal 
borders would affect the area of immigration in order to control the flows of 
people, most particularly the undocumented ones.
45
 Mutimer‟s ambitious and 
persuasive study shows that a political entity would indisputably follow an 
economic and political unification.
46
   
 Yet another support for the “spillover” effect is introduced in Chien-Yi 
Lu‟s work. The author traces a number of initiatives for collective migration 
policymaking in the history of European integration though analysis of rationales 
behind them. The scholar argues that the increasing cooperation in the field is 
found in “spillover” effects, elite advocacy and support of technocrats,
47
 thus 
promoting a supranationalist outlook on integration of migration policies.  
 To name just a few scholars in the field of international migration, 
Andrew Gebbes, Dietmar Herz and Virgine Guiraudon present an alternative 
account to the timing of European cooperation. Although the Single Market 
provided an impetus to the harmonization of immigration and asylum fields, 
Gebbes adds that “it is rather difficult to argue that the SM alone caused this 
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cooperation, which had begun to develop prior to the Single European Act (SEA) 
and was linked to attempts to consolidate control over international migration.”
48
 
Herz, another intergovernmentalist scholar, asserts that, in fact, the first step of 
the European migration policy harmonization clearly resembled an 
intergovernmental pattern, rather than “spillover.” Herz underlines the Franco-
German initiative as a starting point of the policy development in the 1980s.
49
  
 Similarly to Herz, Moravcsik also focuses on the negotiating power of 
France, Germany, and also Britain, but with respect to the Single European Act of 
1987.  Moravcsik describes the SEA as a union of elites between Community 
officials and European business interest groups. Its negotiating history is more 
consistent with an alternative explanation that European reform rested on 
interstate bargains between the three mentioned super states.
50
 His findings 
configure that the SEA was not a result of the “spillover” mechanism. Instead, 
intergovernmentalism, lowest-common-denominator bargaining, and protection of 
sovereignty played decisive role in the implementation of the SEA.
51
 The scholar 
claims that the primary motivations of the member states are rooted in 
convergence of national economic preferences.
52
  Such an argument relates to 
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Gebbes and Herz‟s assertions about rationales behind the timing of the 
cooperation in the immigration arena.  
 Unlike the previously-mentioned scholars, Guiraudon rejects both the 
“spillover” mechanism and pure interstate bargaining. She describes both theories 
as inadequate to provide analytical tools. Instead, the scholar generates the theory 
of “venue-shopping” and describes how political actors seek policy venues, where 
the balance of forces favors their ideal policy outcomes. Thus, governments have 
circumvented national constraints on migration control by creating transnational 
cooperation mechanisms dominated by law and order officials in trans-
governmental working groups.  Moreover, similarly to intergovernmentalist 
advocates, Guiraudon gives the EU institutions only a minor role.
53
  
The Process of the Harmonization of Immigration Policies 
 The development of a “common” immigration policy has followed a rather 
slow and winding pathway. Gebbes is one among experts who describe it as an 
incremental progress, coupled with reluctance of the member states to empower 
the supranational institutions.
54
 He introduces four periods of EU cooperation in 
the field of immigration and asylum. He argues that the recent period of 
communitarization, which was initiated by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999, did 
not “supranationalize” the immigration regime. Martin A. Schain makes a similar 
assessment of the policy harmonization. The year 1999 showed a considerable 
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progress in the fight against illegal immigration and external border controls.
55
 
However, previous years revealed very limited cooperation at the EU level. In her 
2000 work, Guiraudon also mentions that the harmonization process remains 
largely intergovernmental, where the EU institutions have in fact played a minor 
role. In addition, Gallya Lahav, a leading researcher of European immigration 
politics, shows that despite progress toward a “common” immigration policy, the 
nation states still resist in many respects, thus revealing that their national-level 
interests and decision making remain crucial.
56
 
  In another influential article, Gebbes takes the argument into a new 
direction and asserts that, in fact, EU cooperation has helped the member states to 
consolidate more regulation of international migration via the gradual 
harmonization of national-level immigration policies.
57
  Moreover, the scholar 
perceives the European coordination through the state-centric prism. He argues 




 To the contrary of the above scholarship, which attributes active role of 
the member states in the process of European integration, Sandholtz recognizes 
the EU institutions as drivers of integration. Sandholtz mostly attributes power to 
the European Commission and the European Court of Justice, even arguing that 
such institutions can, in fact, shape national governments and thus define their 
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 The scholar openly criticizes liberal intergovernmentalism, which, 
according to him, is a mere account of state-to-state bargaining. The state-centric 
theory not only excludes everyday policymaking and solely focuses on treaties, 




 Several authors referenced in this research stress that the process of the 
communitarization of immigration policies has followed a restrictive pattern. In 
their persuading article, Terri Givens and Adam Luedtke argue that when political 
salience is high (like in the case of immigration issues), national governments 
either block harmonization, or allow only restrictive pathway of harmonization at 
the EU level.
61
 Schain makes a similar observation. He claims that, although 
progress has been noticeable with regards to the fight against illegal immigration 
and border control, failure to harmonize immigration policies stems from the fact 
that if cooperation takes place, it tends to support control and exclusion, rather 
than expansion and harmonization.
62
 Lahav also questions the outcome of the 
ongoing harmonization of immigration policies. According to her evaluation, the 
European Union resembles a hybrid of intergovernmentalism and 
supranationalism in the field of migration regime. Thus, a potential “common” 
immigration policy would be rather restrictive in nature.
63
  
The EC/EU’s Influence on the Spanish Immigration Laws and Policies 
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 A body of scholarship has focused on the EU institutions‟ influence on the 
member states‟ policymaking. Generally, this top-down process has been called 
Europeanization. With regards to Spain, its accession to the European Community 
(EC) in 1986 has not only legitimized its then-recent transition to democracy, but 
also allowed Europe to exert substantial impact on its national policies and 
legislations. Experts on Spanish immigration have presented mixed opinions 
regarding the timing of the country‟s first immigration law in the mid-1980s. 
Wayne Cornelius argues that immigration policy in Spain arose from the EC 
pressure;
64
 and Gemma Pinyol pinpoints that Spain needed to meet the 
Community standards.
65
 In addition, Francisco Javier Moreno Fuentes asserts that 
LO 7/1985, the first immigration focusing on the rights and liberties of the 
foreigners in Spain, was nothing more than placing Spain as a gatekeeper of the 
EC‟s southern border. Similarly to Pinyol‟s argument, the document‟s 
restrictiveness and focus on border controls did not correspond with the migratory 
processes that were affecting Spain at that time.
66
  
 The early 1990s continued to portray the EU‟s impact on Spanish 
policymaking. Expiration of the country‟s agreements with Morocco and Tunisia 
for mutual suppression of visas coincided with the EU‟s pressure for the control 
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of external borders. Moreno Fuentes asserts that this change related to 
immigration policies designed at the EU level. Toughened external frontiers also 
appeared as a precondition for the incorporation of Spain into the Schengen 
Agreement in 1992.
67
 Moreover, Kitty Calavita, whose work focuses on 
immigration and integration policies in Spain, adds that despite the stepped-up 
pressure from the EU before Spain‟s signature under the Schengen Agreements in 
1992, visa requirements, in fact, followed new controls against countries, which 
were the source of large numbers of illegal residents.
68
 
 EU directives and regulations could be regarded as a major step toward the 
supranationalization of national policies. In terms of binding documents in the 
area of immigration and asylum, Spain has been a pioneer in transposing them 
within general reforms of their immigration law. In her chapter, Margit Fauser 
argues that Spain has followed a rather selective pathway of Europeanization. 
That said, its central government has selectively chosen conclusions and 
objectives reached at the EU level (at times non-binding).
69
 Fauser names a 
number of recent Council directives since 2000, which became a part of the third 
Spanish immigration law - LO 14/2003.  
 In other words, the EU‟s impact on Spanish policymaking has revealed a 
“pick-and-choose” nature, where the central government has applied EU 
objectives and (empathically) directives/regulations, when and where needed. 
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Ryan Newton‟s research clearly reveals this selectiveness with regard to non-
binding conclusions of the Tampere Summit. As he shows, the Tampere 
objectives were incorporated into the Spanish legal code in order to further restrict 
policies affecting illegal immigration and external border controls. The 
administration of former Prime Minister José María Aznar used the Tampere 
Summit conclusions as a scapegoat for advancing its own national agenda.
70
 
Spain’s Impact on the EU Policy Development 
 Two prominent scholars on Spain‟s membership in the European Union 
and its impact on both Spain itself and the EU, Carlos Closa and Paul M. 
Heywood, devote a chapter of their book on Spain‟s intergovernmentalist 
approach to policymaking at the EU level.
71
 They present three dimensions that 
support intergovernmentalist interpretation. Firstly, Spain has engaged in “insider 
policies,” by placing nationals in key positions in Brussels in order to help to 
shape policy from the inside. Secondly, use of the EU Presidency has steered 
policies in a particular direction. Thirdly, Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs), 
which occur before treaty amendments and enlargements, have been used to 
pursue national interests.
72
 Therefore, they show how the Spanish government has 
taken advantage of its role as an international player.  
 Historically speaking, the active participation in the construction of a 
“common” immigration policy officially dates back to the Spanish Presidency of 
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the EU in 2002.
73
 Pinyol asserts that the Presidency and the Seville Summit 
outlined the country‟s intention to place immigration issues as a top priority on 
the EU agenda.
74
 In her article, Elisabeth Johannson- Nogués shows how the 
Presidency was used as a way to coordinate the member states on issues related to 
this Spanish dilemma.
75
 Moreover, Closa and Heywood also see the 2002 
Presidency as an arena to prioritize immigration and asylum policies.
76
 
 As Fauser states, the EU Presidency not only emphasized the need to 
address growing concerns related to illegal immigration and external border 
controls, but also used the Seville Summit‟s conclusions to initiate an introduction 
of a new Council Directive 2004/82 on the obligation of carriers to communicate 
passenger data. The Directive aimed at harmonizing carriers‟ financial penalties 
provided for by the member states. Fauser also emphasizes that the Seville 
conclusions were a mere continuation of the Tampere objectives.
 77
   
 Carmen González Enríquez and Alicia Sorroza Blanco from the Real 
Instituto Elcano assert that Spain promoted FRONTEX (2004) and the Global 
Approach (2005), which had a clear Spanish stamp on them. The authors add that 
Spain has in fact been one of the building blocks of a harmonized approach to 
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 Some scholars in the field of the Spain‟s role on EU policymaking have 
focused on plausible rationales behind such an active advocacy for the “common” 
immigration policy development. Closa and Heywood conclude that Spain has 
been able to use the EU as an effective tool to resolve its domestic issues, mainly 
through developing ideas and concepts, which are now embedded into EU 
policies.
79
 As I already referenced, Newton gives a similar account by analyzing 
the Spanish government‟s adoption of the Tampere Summit‟s conclusions. He 
clearly presents that Spain incorporated the non-binding Tampere objectives into 
its legal body (the third immigration law - LO 8/2000) and used it as justification 
for more restrictive reforms.
80
  
 Several internal and external socio-economic and cultural events that took 
place in the recent years have also become excuses for introducing tougher stance 
on illegal immigration. One of such circumstances was the El Ejido crime, where 
a Moroccan immigrant murdered a young Spanish woman. As Ricard Zapata-
Barrero argues, this unfortunate event not only ignited anti-immigrant revolts, but 
also placed immigration under socio-political agenda. As the general election 
approached, the conservative political party, the Partido Popular (PP), politicized 
                                                 
78
 Carmen González Enríquez and Alicia Sorroza Blanco, “Working towards a European 
Immigration Policy,” Real Instituto Elcano, working paper 57 (2009), 
http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_eng/Print?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/
wps/wcm/connect/elcano/Elcano_in/Zonas_in/DT57-2009 (accessed January 18, 2011). 
79
 Closa and Heywood, Spain and the European Union, 244. 
80
 Newton, “Spanish Immigration Policy.” 
29 
the event for its mere electoral profit.
81
 The PP capitalized on the public‟s 
discontent with immigration and linked it to the upcoming elections and 
legislation. This highly publicized tragedy benefited the right-wing party, which 
found a solid ground to further restrict the immigration law.
82
 
 On the other hand, Zapata-Barrero and Nynke de Witte show how Spain 
has raised awareness that illegal immigration is not just a Spanish problem, but 
also a European one.
83
 Thus, such a transposition of a domestic issue onto the EU 
level has encouraged the central government to seek a new problem-solving 
venue. Laura Tedesco, who focuses on the recent economic crisis and its 
challenges to Spanish immigration policies, argues that utilization of the EU as a 
venue to fulfill domestic demands and preferences may become more pronounced 
nowadays. Similarly to the Tampere Summit‟s conclusions, the Spanish 
government can again argue that further restrictiveness is due to an essential step 
to align national immigration policies with EU objectives.
84
 
My Theoretical Position and Contribution 
 
In this study, my argument is twofold: firstly, at the EU level, I follow 
theoretical footsteps of intergovernmentalist scholars, like Gebbes and Herz, and 
assert that the Single Market was not the major impetus, which caused 
cooperation in the field of immigration. It was an intergovernmental pattern rather 
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than the “spillover” mechanism. I also agree with immigration experts (Gebbes, 
Schain, Lahav) who claim that the process of the “common” immigration policy 
development has shown a very steady and restrictive pathway. 
Secondly, I find arguments by Cornelius, Pinyol, and Moreno Fuentes 
convincing with respect to the timing of the first Spanish immigration law. Upon 
Spain‟s entrance to the European Community, the centralized institutions 
pressured the country to implement a set of regulations that would target its 
foreign population. Moreover, I fully agree with Closa and Heywood‟s argument 
that Spain has been a pioneer in influencing the formation of EU objectives in the 
arena of immigration. I call the Mediterranean country one of the leaders in the 
process of EU policymaking because Spain has used the EU as an effective tool to 
solve its domestic issues. With respect to the arena of illegal immigration and 
external border controls, I focus on the EU and Spain‟s impact on each other‟s 
policymaking. Thus, my thesis presents the country‟s extensive advocacy for a 
restrictive, “communitarized” policy as a means to meet national demands.  
To strengthen my hypothesis, I incorporate Moravcsik‟s three-tier 
mechanism of EU negotiations: national preference formation, interstate 
bargaining and institutional choice. Since Moravcsik‟s framework only focuses on 
official negotiations between the member states, my work serves as an innovative 
approach to Moravcsik‟s mechanism because I apply his theory at the national 
level and examine Spain‟s impact on EU initiatives inside and outside of interstate 
negotiations. Moreover, contrary to Moravcsik‟s attribution of a passive role to 
31 
the electorate, I describe it as a very influential body in the process of national 










































Chapter 3: Chronological Evolution of the Process of the  
Development of a “Common” Immigration Policy 
 
 Above I outlined and scrutinized three of many theories of European 
integration: neofunctionalism, supranationalism and (liberal) 
intergovernmentalism. In this chapter, I introduce the evolution of the process of 
the “common” immigration policy development with respect to the empowerment 
of the EU institutions and the character of the “common” policy rhetoric. I explain 
these phenomena across the three decades of their evolution: the 1980s, the 1990s, 
and the 2000s. I follow each time framework by a subsection, which defines a 
noticeable character of each period. Even though I include only a short paragraph 
about the 1970s with respect to European integration, I focus mostly on the last 
three decades. As I show below, the 1980s reveal restrictive intergovernmental 
cooperation; the 1990s follow restrictive and mixed harmonization trend; finally, 
the 2000s clearly portray further restrictive and gradual harmonization. This 
chapter intends to show that Spain, as a nation state, has played a decisive role in 









Map 1 - The European Union  
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European experience with immigration had not been of an alarming 
concern up until the second half of the twentieth century. Migration to selected 
Western European countries was mainly driven by economic and infrastructural 
devastation caused by the two World Wars. The so-called “guest workers” 
predominantly came from Southern European states. Instead of staying only 
temporarily, the low-skilled laborers settled permanently in the new host 
countries, usually industrialized countries in Northern and Western Europe. 
Inflow of migrants after the Second World War, whether as asylum seekers or 
laborers, accounted for elevated concerns among the EU heads of state and 
government. That said such distress mobilized development of legal approaches 
to deal with overstaying migrants and guest workers. According to Rainer Münz, 
today‟s 27 EU member states had a total population of 415 million in 1960. The 
34 
number has increased to over 495 million now.
85
 As of 2009, almost 31 million 
people living in the European Union (EU27) are foreign-born migrants. That 
number amounts for 6.2 percent of the total population.
86
 
As the European population has significantly increased since the mid-
twentieth century, the period preceding a collective policy activity of the states in 
the immigration arena has been characterized by minimal cooperation. I could 
engage in an argument that the Treaties of Rome establishing the European 
Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community 
(EURATOM) in 1957 marked a first attempt to prepare the European Community 
for the establishment of a future “common” immigration policy. The Treaties of 
Rome introduced the “free movement of goods, persons, services, and capital,” 
the so-called “four freedoms,” which became a legal reality with the 
implementation of the Single European Act of 1987. One of the freedoms is free 
movement of workers (only EC-nationals) within the borders of the Community. 
Such freedom complimented the economic structuring of a common market.
87
 
Nationals of the establishing states gained access to employment and self-
employment in any of the signatory countries.
88
 The freedoms subscribed to the 
ideology of supranationalism, envisioned by Schuman and Monnet, where, as I 
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referenced, national control was transposed to the Community level. However, 
lack of any substantive legal basis in the Treaties for the harmonization of 
immigration policies alienated the policy from control and influence of the 
supranational institutions in the 1960s and 1970s.  
The 1970s – Stagnation of European Integration 
The European Commission attempted to take over some aspects of illegal 
immigration under the EC control as early as in the 1970s. The member states‟ 
reluctance to delegate their sovereign power over such sensitive issues resulted in 
repetitive deferral of the communitarization of immigration policies. This 
„Eurosclerosis‟ resulted from former French President Charles de Gaulle‟s 
unwillingness to cede France‟s control over its vital affairs, which ultimately led 
to the Luxembourg Compromise of 1965. The compromise re-introduced the 
member states‟ right to veto decisions undertaken by the European Community.
89
  
The intergovernmentalist sentiments of the late 1960s and 1970s could 
have, in fact, considerably influenced such adverse national approaches to further 
European integration. Nonetheless, the member states had managed to promote 
cooperative actions outside of the Community structure, siding with 
intergovernmental cooperation. To give an example, TREVI, whose acronym 
stands for Terrorism, Radicalism, Extremism, and International Violence, was 
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formed in 1975 to cooperate on internal security measures. The group‟s tasks 
eventually broadened in 1985-86 to include the fight against international crime.
90
  
The 1980s – Re-Launching of the Integration Process 
 
Despite of the 1979 oil crisis and the early 1980s economic stagnation of 
the European countries, the further harmonization of policies was not much 
affected by internal and external obstacles. The 1980s witnessed revival of 
European integration. Completion of the Single Market, as being the largest 
project, significantly influenced the political policy areas, which included the area 
of immigration and asylum. This particular active engagement in the 
harmonization process might have begun thanks to either the “spillover” 
mechanism or mere interstate cooperation. Two crucial documents, which placed 
emphasis on active collaboration in the immigration realm, were the Schengen 
Agreements of 1985 and the amendment of the Treaties of Rome- the Single 
European Act (SEA) of 1987.  
In 1986, the TREVI/Interior Ministers set up yet another 
intergovernmental body, the Ad Hoc (Working) Group on Immigration 
(AHWGI/AHGI). A myriad of the AHWGI/AHGI groups and subgroups 
improved checks at external borders of the European Community, coordinated 
visa policies and combated passport fraud. The creation of the AHWGI/AHGI 
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The Schengen Agreements- 1985 
A first, official step toward the harmonization of immigration policies was 
undertaken by the Schengen Agreements initially signed in June 1985 by five core 
EC countries: France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg.
92
 As 
Guiraudon asserts, “there was no formal intergovernmental cooperation on the 
subject [of immigration] before the 1985 Schengen Agreement and no EU 
competence for immigration policy before 1992.”
93
 The signatory countries 
launched a joint agreement outside of the EC framework. Due to British and Irish 
opposition to cooperation in immigration issues, Germany and France succeeded, 
driven by their domestic interests, to implement the Schengen Agreements as an 
alternative to a Community solution.
94
 In 1990, the member states signed yet 
another agreement titled the Schengen Convention, often referred to as Schengen 
II. The document focused on application of the internal border elimination and 
free movement provisions outlined in the original Schengen document. 
Ultimately, the year of 1995 officially abolished border controls.
95
 Schengen 
Information System (SIS I) became also operational in 1995. It was a 
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sophisticated database used by authorities of the Schengen member countries to 
exchange data on certain categories of people and goods. 
Although the Schengen Agreements prospered outside of the EC structure, 
their formulation served as a template for further Community establishment of 
specific measures in the early 1990s after introduction of the internal market. That 
being said, Schengen became a precursor to internal and mutual cooperation 
based on the Single Market. The initial aim of the Schengen Agreements was to 
make a speedier progress in dismantling internal frontiers, originated as a reaction 
to roadblocks set up by trucks at internal borders.
96
 Migration developed as a 
national concern only later.  
The Schengen regime targeted the securing or strengthening of external 
borders in order to diminish the influx of illegal immigrants, especially after the 
fall of Communism in Central and Eastern Europe.
97
 Illegal immigration became 
an expensive challenge to the signatory countries. The Schengen Agreements 
sought to enhance the patrol of external borders and impose more rigid controls 
against countries outside of Schengen.
98
 As Lahav argues, “the evolution of 
Schengen captures the restrictive implications of coordination for migration.”
99
 In 
a sense, abolishing the internal borders of the Schengen zone led to immigration 
policy restrictions due to the “porous” nature of internal frontiers and control of 
occasionally permeable external borders. In Article 7 under Title I, Schengen 
reads as follows: 
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The Parties shall endeavour to approximate their visa policies as 
soon as possible in order to avoid the adverse consequences in the 
field of immigration and security that may result from easing 
checks at the common borders. They shall take, if possible by 1 
January 1986, the necessary steps in order to apply their 
procedures for the issue of visas and admission to their territories, 
taking into account the need to ensure the protection of the entire 
territory of the five States against illegal immigration and activities 




The above article calls for visa harmonization to avoid negative consequences that 
would result in the removal of internal borders.
101
 Common visa policies would 
correlate with the harmonized immigration approach through implementation of a 
list of third countries whose nationals required visas to enter the Schengen area. 
As the mid-1980s acutely shifted an outlook on international migration, Schengen 
became a pioneer of the intensified European illegal immigration stance. 
The Single European Act- 1987 
On July 1, 1987 the Single European Act (SEA) marked a profound 
deepening of the envisioned common market, but this time under the Community 
framework. The White Paper presented by the European Commission to the 
European Council of Ministers during the Milan Summit in June 1985 outlined 
about 300 legislative proposals for creation of the Single Market.
102
 Based on this 
document, the European Community aimed at establishing the goal by December 
31, 1992.   
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Article 8A of the SEA envisioned an area without internal frontiers. It 
declares, “The internal market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers in 
which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in 
accordance with the provisions of this Treaty.”
103
 The SEA underlined an 
objective of creating a market, which would be unattainable without 
implementation of the “four freedoms” of movement. Thanks to the “freedom of 
labor,” the communitarization of immigration policies was given priority for 
further development. However, the SEA did not introduce substantial provisions 
that would transfer control over immigration policies to the supranational level. 
As Callovi mentions, with respect to migration, the SEA only concentrated on 
problems related to the removal of physical controls.
104
 General Declaration on 
Articles 13 to 19 clearly states: 
Nothing in these provisions shall affect the right of Member States 
to take such measures as they consider necessary for the purpose of 
controlling immigration from third countries, and to combat 





According to this statement, the European Community did not gain substantive 
competence over immigration policies of the member states. Based on both 
Schengen and the Single European Act, Callovi argues that a harmonized policy 
on border controls had been technically feasible without the creation of a 
“common” immigration policy.
106
 Roger Hansen makes a similar observation in 
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terms of a common market. He asserts that a customs union could in fact deliver 
substantial payoffs without creation of a political union.
107
 
As already referenced, the SEA confirmed “four freedoms” enshrined in 
the Treaties of Rome.
108
 Nationals of the EC member states could freely move 
across borders of the member countries. As Lahav emphasizes, the word “people” 
was not intended to address all residents. Thus, the SEA legislation was only 
applicable to EC nationals and their families.
109
 Reasons behind exclusion of the 
third-country nationals lay in expansive interpretation of the Article 8A 
mentioned above. 
The 1985 Commission‟s Guidelines for a Community Policy on Migration 
focused on three main areas where the Commission intended to focus on: 
 development of Community legislation for migrants who are 
citizens of Member States; consultation between Member States 
and the Commission on problems faced by migrants and 
introduction of Community guidelines to deal with such problems; 





As the Commission formulated the first guidelines for a unified policy on 
migration issues, the member states‟ resistance to integration in areas of “high 
politics” (visa, asylum policies, and the status of non-EC nationals) was evident in 
the rejection of a common approach to immigration and asylum policies. The 
1980s cooperation in the migration field unfolded outside of the EU institutions. 
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This observation brings to discussion Hoffman‟s intergovernmentalist skepticism 
of the nation states‟ sovereignty loss over highly sensitive areas of politics.  
As the free movement of EC nationals fell under the competencies of the 
European Commission and the European Court of Justice, the European Council 
of Ministers retained unanimity regarding the right of non-EC nationals to move 
unconditionally across the borders. Additionally, immigration and asylum policies 
continued to remain outside of the EC framework. Individual member states 
enjoyed national control over the entrance of foreigners to their territories. Under 
the SEA, the European Commission was only loosely associated with 
intergovernmental cooperation of the member states in the migration area, 
whereas the supranational European Court of Justice and the European Parliament 
were mainly excluded. The SEA created the “cooperation” procedure in the 
Parliament, which increased its weight in the legislation process. However, its 
power remained modest until the introduction of the “co-decision I” through the 
Treaty of the European Union (1993), and the “co-decision II” through the Treaty 
of Amsterdam (1999), which made the European Parliament a bigger player in 
EU politics. Both Schengen and the SEA pursued market integration in addition 
to restrictive immigration and asylum policies.
111
 The SEA, as well as Schengen 
to an extent, initiated a very slow and incremental movement toward the final 
product of a “communitarized” immigration policy.  
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The 1980s- Restrictive Intergovernmental Cooperation 
The early 1980s reflected integration stagnation and economic slowdown 
in Western Europe and the European Community. While the recession created 
soaring rates of inflation and unemployment, the East-West tension only 
amplified. Increased rate of immigration had grown out of control and it was 
politically untenable to sustain inflow of labor migration.
112
 Gebbes coined four 
periods of the European Community cooperation development in the immigration 
area. The first period incorporated years between 1957 and 1986. From the 
Treaties of Rome until the Single European Act (exclusively), the European 
Community witnessed a “minimal immigration policy involvement.”
113
 During 
this time span, intergovernmental cooperation in the immigration sphere 
flourished through inter-state coordination. The second period, “informal 
intergovernmentalism,” encompassed a period from 1986 to 1993. This phase was 
initiated by the Single European Act. As Gebbes states, “states were keen to 
pursue their domestic immigration control objectives at the EU level without 
empowering the EU institutions.”
114
 As the post-SEA period showed, the member 
states exhibited skepticism with regards to ceding competencies to the 
supranational institutions. Several intergovernmental groups, whose objectives 
concentrated on external border controls, asylum, deportations, and terrorism, 
continued to favor intergovernmentalism and minimal Community influence on 
the process of the development of a “common” immigration policy.  
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Reluctance to granting control to the EC institutions correlated with 
interstate cooperation, and resulted in restrictive measures in the migration sphere, 
particularly with regards to illegal migration and external border patrols. The 
Iranian oil crisis of 1979 affected the economic recovery in Europe.
115
 Most 
Western European countries introduced strict, national immigration regulations in 
the 1970s, using the oil crisis as a pretext to tackle immigration burden. 
The socio-economic situation of the 1980s mobilized the EC member 
states to cooperate in the migration sphere in order to restrict certain policies 
through the harmonization process. This cooperation unfolded mainly outside of 
the EU institutions. However, as Gebbes argues, the European Community served 
as a “new venue” for the pursuit of domestic policy objectives
116
 - objectives that 
projected national demands of the nation states. The member states reconciled 
with the definition of the envisioned immigration cooperation as rather restrictive 
and intergovernmental.  
The 1990s – Mixed Harmonization of the Immigration Arena 
 
The early 1990s witnessed a new period of deeper political integration. 
The fall of Communism in Eastern Europe and the process of German unification 
speeded up implementation of yet another treaty amendment that would not only 
deal with external political and economic events, but also with internal 
strengthening of the Single Market. The collapse of the Iron Curtain manifested 
into a massive movement of migrants from the East to West. This predictable 
diaspora markedly invigorated further policy restrictions in the immigration 
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 Governments of the member states rationalized the upcoming treaty as 
a legitimate document, which addressed the ongoing immigration dilemma at the 
EU level. Several ad hoc intergovernmental groups in the post-SEA period lacked 
adequate proposals and thus the subsequent treaty raised hopes for further 
harmonization.  
The Treaty of the European Union - 1993 
 The Treaty of the European Union (TEU) entered into force on November 
1, 1993. Unlike the Single European Act, the TEU formalized cooperation on 
immigration by placing it under one of three newly created pillars- the semi-
intergovernmental (hybrid) pillar of the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). 
Although the pillar was placed under the EU roof, aspects of immigration policy 
were a subject to a “common interest” rather than a “common policy.”
118
 The 
“common interest” under Title IV, Article K1, includes:  
Asylum policy; rules governing the crossing by persons of the 
external borders of the Member States and the exercise of controls 
thereon; immigration policy and policy regarding nationals of third 
countries: a) conditions of entry and movement by nationals of 
third countries on the territory of Member States; b) conditions of 
residence by nationals of third countries on the territory of Member 
States, including family reunion and access to employment; c) 
combating unauthorized immigration, residence and work by 




These points, as Brochmann adds, represented an extension of the areas covered 
by the extra-Community Schengen Agreements. The TEU also introduced a 
concept of “people‟s Europe,” which involved the notion of European citizenship, 
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which would be granted to prospective EU nationals. Moreover, the name change 
from the European Community to the European Union indicated nothing more 
than further social, political and economic integration.  
 Brochmann sees the TEU as a political will of the then twelve member 
states to develop a prospective “common” immigration policy.
120
 In terms of 
migration, the TEU compromised between principles of intergovernmentalism 
and supranationalism. The member states retained their traditional authority over 
certain aspects of immigration and asylum policies addressed in the third pillar. 
The “common interest” involved initiatives of both the European Commission and 
the member states. According to the Article K3, 
1. In the areas referred to in Article K.1, Member States shall 
inform and consult one another within the Council with a view to 
coordinating their action. To that end, they shall establish 
collaboration between the relevant departments of their 
administrations;  
  2. The Council may: on the initiative of any Member State or of 
the Commission, in the areas referred to in Article K.1(1) to (6); on 
the initiative of any Member State, in the areas referred to in 
Article K1(7) to (9): 
(a)  adopt joint positions and promote, using the appropriate form 
and procedures, any cooperation contributing to the pursuit of the 
objectives of the Union; 
(b)  adopt joint action in so far as the objectives of the Union can 
be attained better by joint action than by the Member States acting 
individually on account of the scale or effects of the action 
envisaged; it may decide that measures implementing joint action 
are to be adopted by a qualified majority. 
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 The supranational side of the TEU allowed the “common interests” under the 
Article K1 to be ultimately relocated under the Community pillar, potentially 
extending the Community law to some areas of the JHA.
121
  
 Other scholars have had a less optimistic outlook on the TEU. Although, 
for instance, it upgraded the role of the European Parliament, the TEU brought 
victory to intergovernmentalism.
122
 Adam Luedtke states that,  
The resulting Maastricht Treaty prevented immigration policy 
from becoming „supranationalized‟ in four respects: 1) it allowed 
member states the right of initiative to propose new EU-level 
measures (in “normal” EU decision-making, it is only the 
Commission who can propose new measures); 2) it allowed the 
Parliament only the right to be “consulted” over decisions, but 
gave it no veto or amendment power; 3) it prevented the ECJ from 
having legal jurisdiction over immigration; and 4) it allowed any 




As Lahav mentions, the communitarian approach that was adopted only facilitated 
the free movement of EU citizens and their equal treatment within the EU; 
immigration and asylum would be dealt at the intergovernmental level with the 
JHA,
124
 leaving most significant issues (asylum, illegal migration, and visa 
policies) of migration policy outside of the EU umbrella. Therefore, the Treaty of 
the European Union formalized cooperation of immigration policies, but it did not 
harmonize them due to sound opposition from some member states against giving 
up competencies to the EU institutions. Nonetheless, the TEU drew the project of 
the immigration harmonization near the envisioned supranational entity of the 
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founding fathers due to its noticeable connection between internal free movement 
and increased external border controls.
125
 Parameters of the “common” 
immigration policy rhetoric began to evolve with an emphasis on selective 
measures toward securitizing external frontiers from influx of illegal immigrants. 
The Treaty of Amsterdam- 1997-1999 
 Central components of the discourse on the path to the Treaty of 
Amsterdam revolved around immigration and asylum policies. The Treaty came 
into force on May 1, 1999 and introduced a new Title IV Visas, Asylum, 
Immigration and Other Policies Related to Free Movement of Persons. Under this 
title, articles captured matters associated with asylum, immigration and external 
border controls as contingent of Community procedures after five years (2004) 
from the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam.
126
 With respect to the 
immigration policy arena, Luedtke asserts that 
It was agreed that after five years, the Commission would gain the 
sole right of initiative, the Parliament would gain the power of „co-
decision,‟ the unanimity requirement (national veto) in the Council 
would disappear, and decisions would thus be taken by a majority 
vote (though this arrangement would have to be implemented by a 
unanimous vote after the five-year transition period!).  It was also 
agreed to give the European Court of Justice jurisdiction over 
immigration, though with a special exception, in that only high 




Moreover, the European Court of Justice would only act on the basis of a referral 
from the “high courts” in the member states.
128
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From a perspective of pro-internationalists, the key achievements of the 
Treaty of Amsterdam were creation of the area of freedom, justice and security, 
and incorporation of “the Schengen acquis”
129
 into the EU framework. Significant 
changes to the third pillar included transition of visa, asylum and immigration 
policies, as well as judicial cooperation in civil matters, to the Community pillar. 
Lahav defines this move as “a gradual step toward a supranational immigration 
policy.”
130
 To the bewilderment of many, the Treaty of Amsterdam did not 
“supranationalize” the immigration policy, but rather “communitarized” it.
131
 
Luedtke states that the Treaty achieved only a partial supranationalization over 
migration.
132
 Transfer of the Justice and Home Affairs significantly extended 
tentacles of supranationalism. However, introduction of qualified majority voting 
(QMV) in the European Council of Ministers would still have to be implemented 
through a unanimous vote. Therefore, any member state, represented by its 
national minister, would have a leeway to veto the proposal. Partially winning 
institutions in the post-Amsterdam period were the European Commission and the 
European Parliament -the two supranational EU institutions, which have been 
more open to rights-oriented framework of a “common” immigration policy and 
thus constituted excellent targets of pro-immigrant NGOs.
133
 The Treaty of 
Amsterdam incorporated anti-discriminatory provisions (especially outlined in the 
Article 13) and thus gave a more human face to the development of immigration 
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and asylum policies at the EU level. Nonetheless, the overall approach to illegal 
immigration continued to exert a restrictive nature. Since 1985, creation of the 
migratory policy regime has pursued a limited and selective approach to treatment 
of undocumented third country immigrants.   
The Tampere Summit - 1999 
Shortly after the introduction of the Treaty of Amsterdam, a meeting of 
the EU heads of state and government was held in Tampere, Finland, on October 
15-16, 1999. The meeting focused on the following themes: common asylum and 
migration policies; a union-wide fight against crime; and a stronger external 
action.
134
 One of the Tampere Summit‟s milestones outlines the following: 
It would be in contradiction with Europe's traditions to deny 
freedom to those whose circumstances lead them justifiably to seek 
access to our territory. This in turn requires the Union to develop 
common policies on asylum and immigration, while taking into 
account the need for a consistent control of external borders to stop 
illegal immigration and to combat those who organise it and 
commit related international crimes. These common policies must 
be based on principles which are both clear to our own citizens and 




The Tampere Summit pointed out a mutual obligation to equally treat non-EU 
nationals who stay within the EU borders. On the one hand, some of its objectives 
aligned with the European Commission and the European Parliament‟s more 
liberal and immigrant-friendly approach. On the other hand, the heads of state and 
government projected a plan to curtail the inflow of illegal immigrants through 
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tougher external border controls. An envisioned “common” immigration policy 
would facilitate the control of inflowing immigrants by developing common 
measures dealing with illegal border crossings.  
 Notwithstanding the fact that the Tampere Summit supported anti-
discrimination provisions and the incorporation of non-EU citizens into the 
mainstream society, it markedly underscored the restrictive nature of a projected 
“common” migration policy. So far, the European treaties have guaranteed the 
freedom of movement to all EU nationals, and for all non-EU nationals who 
reside legally within the borders of the EU.
136
 This approach articulated a need to 
combat illegal immigration and expel illegal migrants from the EU territory. 
Additionally, despite repetitive efforts to formulate a supranational immigration 
policy, the member states continued to address undocumented immigrants at the 
national level through various measures, be it regularization programs, fixed 
quotas on immigrants or mass deportation.
137
  
The 1990s- Further Restrictive and Mixed Harmonization 
 The Treaty of the European Union initiated a novel momentum in the 
immigration policy realm. It served as a jump start to Gebbes‟ third period of the 
immigration cooperation development titled “formal intergovernmental 
cooperation.” Most of the member states and the EU institutions have framed a 
“common” immigration policy as a restrictive tool, which targeted uncontrolled 
influx of the third-country nationals. With respect to migration, “fortress Europe” 
continued to grow in the 1990s. Uncontrolled migrant inflows and permeable 
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external borders had become of a disquieting concern for national policymakers, 
politicians and EU officials in the early 1990s. Threats of migration from the 
Central-Eastern Europe after the end of Cold War intensified a strict nature of 
policymaking to tackle undocumented immigration.
138
 Before the 1990s, illegal 
migration was generally defined as an inflow of foreigners who illegally 
overstayed in a country of destination or who entered via unlawful routes. With 
time, however, illegal immigration became to be perceived as a cause of drug 
trafficking and international crime. This negative connotation was embedded in 
the EU rhetoric, which labeled the threat of uncontrolled migration as startling. 
The 2000s – More Pronounced Harmonization of the Immigration Arena 
 The twenty-first century not only escalated a number of inflowing 
immigrants to certain European countries thanks to their economic prosperity, but 
also the emergence of pronounced securitization of immigration policies. 
Unilateral approach to illegal immigration has shown ineffectiveness; “porous” 
external borders fueled further determination to bring immigration policies to the 
EU level. As shown below, treaties, summits and programs implemented in the 
2000s have resulted in the pronounced process of the development of a 
“common” migration policy. The recent years have clearly demonstrated the 
ongoing communitarization of the immigration policy area.
139
  
The Treaty of Nice- 2001 
Following the Amsterdam Treaty and the Tampere Summit, the Treaty of 
Nice was signed on February 26, 2001 and entered into force two years later. 
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Similarly to the Treaty of the European Union, the Treaty of Nice was an 
immediate counter-reaction to political externalities. While the fall of 
Communism impacted the reformist actions of the European Union in the early 
1990s, the prospective EU accession of Eastern European countries (2004) also 
invigorated necessary institutional reforms.
140
   
Lahav describes this Treaty amendment as a building block of the 
momentum toward supranationalization of the European Union and its member 
states,
141
 which revealed the French leadership at work. It greatly extended 
qualified majority voting (QMV) to various areas, including further measures to 
facilitate the freedom of movement of EU nationals. Due to enduring reluctance 
of the member states to transfer sovereignty in some sensitive areas, QMV was 
deferred in the immigration and asylum realms. History has indeed repeated itself 
when it comes to analyzing the Treaty of Amsterdam‟s postponement of the QMV 
adoption. The switch to majority votes was deferred to 2004.
142
  Neither the 
Treaty of Amsterdam nor the Treaty of Nice achieved this. Once again, some 
member states took advantage of the unanimous voting in the European Council 
of Ministers and rebuked plans of implementing QMV at the time of the Treaty 
ratification. The Treaty of Nice, as Anna Kicinger and Katarzyna Saczuk mention, 
did not bring any innovative changes in the field of immigration policy.
143
 Rather, 
it concentrated on the extension of matters, which would be submitted to the 
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majority voting procedure in the European Council of Ministers in next five years 
following the signatory date.  
The Laeken Summit- 2001 
The “9/11” heightened security and immigration concerns among the 
developed nation states. Following the Treaty at Nice, the European Council held 
a Summit in Laeken, Belgium, on December 14-15, 2001. A major goal of the 
Laeken Summit concentrated on strengthening and hastening common standards 
on external border controls. The document‟s conclusion outlines the following 
objectives: 
Better management of the Union‟s external border controls will 
help in the fight against terrorism, illegal immigration networks 
and the traffic in human beings. The European Council asks the 
Council of Ministers and the Commission to work out 
arrangements for cooperation between services responsible for 
external border control and to examine the conditions in which a 





In addition to border control, the EU heads of state and government stressed  
 
the urgency to immediately adopt a “common” immigration policy on the basis of 
the preceding Tampere Summit. The European Council aimed at the development 
of a common system for exchanging information on asylum, migration and 
countries of origin, and the establishment of specific programs to fight 
discrimination and racism.
145
 Similarly to Tampere, Laeken outlined non-binding 
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rhetorical goal, thus producing theoretical, rather than practical results, aftereffect 
in the field of a “common” immigration policy. 
146
 
The Seville Summit - 2002 
 Under the Spanish Presidency, the European Council meeting at the 
Seville, Spain, on June 21-22, 2002 specifically focused on the need to establish a 
“common” immigration policy.
147
 The Seville Summit agreed on “increased 
security at external borders with joint operations at ports and airports; creation of 
a special unit of heads of border control from the member states; new rules 
encouraging increased penalties for people smuggling; a policy of speeded up 
repatriations for those who do not qualify.”
148
 Repatriation included joint 
strategies to work with migrant-sending countries. 
 The Seville Summit concretized the restrictive face of a “common” 
immigration policy. Due to its toughened approach to illegal immigration, the 
Seville Summit was accused of moving toward the negatively-connoted notion of 
“fortress Europe.”
149
 Nonetheless, international events of the early-2000s excused 
the Seville agenda and furthered securitization of the immigration issues with 
more restrictions and control on inflowing numbers of third-country migrants. 
The Hague Program- 2004-2009 
 The European Council meeting on November 4-5, 2004, in Brussels, 
Belgium, followed very similar objectives of its preceding meetings. On May 10, 
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2005 the European Commission presented a communication to the European 
Council where it outlined ten priorities of the Hague Program for the next five 
years (2004-2009). Some of the priorities included: fight against terrorism; 
balanced approach to deal with legal and illegal immigration (especially 
combating illegal immigration); controlling external borders and developing a 
visa policy; and tackling organized crime. In terms of illegal immigration and 
terrorism, the Presidency Conclusions clearly mentioned the negative outcomes of 
post-“9/11” and Madrid terrorist attacks of 2004. The document states: 
The security of the European Union and its Member States has 
acquired a new urgency, especially in the light of the terrorist 
attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001 and in Madrid 
on 11 March 2004. The citizens of Europe rightly expect the 
European Union, while guaranteeing respect for fundamental 
freedoms and rights, to take a more effective, joint approach to 
cross-border problems such as illegal migration, trafficking in and 
smuggling of human beings, terrorism and organised crime, as well 




As can be inferred from the treaties and summits I have been discussing, 
augmentation of a more coordinated EU approach to a “common” immigration 
policy has retained a restrictive character, especially at the turn of the century 
with external (“9/11”) and internal (Madrid 2004, Ceuta and Melilla 2005, and 
London bombings 2005) factors. The process of the development of an envisioned 
“common” immigration policy has gradually, albeit very moderately, evolved 
with help of a number of supportive member states and EU officials. The Hague 
Program only added teeth to the process of building the supranational 
immigration empire. 
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The Establishment of FRONTEX – 2004 
 In order to secure the free movement of persons within the EU, the 
European Council, upon the proposal from the European Commission and opinion 
from the European Parliament, passed a Council Regulation (EC) 2007/2004, 
which established a European Agency for the Management of Operational 
Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union 
(FRONTEX) in October, 2004. According to the main website of the agency, 
FRONTEX‟s responsibility lies in “ensuring that the EU external borders remain 
permeable and efficient for bona fide travelers while being an effective barrier to 
cross-border crime.”
151
 FRONTEX could be regarded as a child of “the Schengen 
acquis,” which has aimed at strengthening external borders through mutual 
cooperation of the member states. In Chapter 2, Article 2, the Council Regulation 
lists major tasks of FRONTEX. They are as follows:  
(a) coordinate operational cooperation between Member States in 
the field of management of external borders; (b) assist Member 
States on training of national border guards, including the 
establishment of common training standards; (c) carry out risk 
analyses; (d) follow up on the development of research relevant for 
the control and surveillance of external borders; (e) assist Member 
States in circumstances requiring increased technical and 
operational assistance at external borders; (f) provide Member 





 It is crucial to mention that the independent FRONTEX does not 
constitute a supranational institution per se. The responsibility for control and 
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surveillance of external border lies within the sovereignty of the member states.
153
 
The agency serves as an additional financial and physical assistance in cases of 
inability to nationally deal with a burden of guarding external borders. Its budget 
covers revenue from the EU budget.
154
 Border countries of Eastern, South-Eastern 
and Southern Europe have greatly benefited from FRONTEX as an aid in fighting 
against illegal inflows of immigrants. Its recent development, RABIT 2010 
(Rapid Border Intervention Teams) has aimed at immediate deployment of trained 
border guards in case of urgent and exceptional migratory pressure
155
 (i.e. Greece 
situation in 2010 and North African revolutions in 2011).  
The European Pact on Immigration and Asylum- 2008 
 Although the document I describe below is neither a treaty amendment nor 
a resolution of the European Council summit meeting, it is noteworthy due to its 
sequential contribution to the development of the “common” immigration policy 
rhetoric. The EU heads of state and government adopted the so-called European 
Pact on Immigration and Asylum (EPIA) on October 16, 2008. Similarly to the 
previously-described documents, the document called for political rather than 
legal force. In other words, it did not constitute a concretized basis for a 
“common” immigration policy. The European Parliament, the European Council 
of Ministers, the European Commission and the member states  






 Ibid.   
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planned to implement the EPIA, which was a French initiative negotiated with 
Spain and Germany.
156
 The French Presidency‟s main objective was to establish a 
“common” immigration policy. Endorsement of this document had successfully 
fulfilled some of French President Nicolas Sarkozy‟s reforms. According to 
Sergio Carrera and Massimo Merlino, the EPIA embodied a nationalistic and 
intergovernmental approach, which sought to legitimize certain French 
immigration policies at the EU level.
157
   
 Page two of the document underlined negative consequences of illegal 
immigration affecting the member states. One paragraph reads, “The majority of 
European countries have to cope with illegal immigration, which is an obstacle to 
the smooth integration of legal immigrants, and a cause of conflict. Governments 
cannot settle for such a situation.”
158
 The EPIA commits its member states in five 
key areas:  
To organize legal immigration to take account of the priorities, 
needs and reception capabilities determined by each Member State, 
and to encourage integration; to control illegal immigration by 
ensuring the return of illegal immigrants to their country of origin 
or a country of transit; to make border controls more effective; to 
construct a Europe of asylum; to create a comprehensive 
partnership with countries of origin and transit to encourage 
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 The latter objectives did not escape controversy due to their strong stance on 
expulsion of illegal immigrants, which, as mentioned, reflected French domestic 
interests. In spite of occurring opposition, all 27 member states agreed to follow 
the objectives, perhaps climbing voluntarily toward the creation of a “common” 
immigration policy.  
The document targeted the unwanted immigrants who, by their illegal 
status, contribute, politically and socio-economically, to problems at the national 
and international levels. As already mentioned, the EPIA did not legally bind the 
member states. Like the former treaties (specifically from 1993 and onward) and 
summits (from 1999 and onward), this document haltingly furthered the 
development of a unified migration policy. It could be said that the Treaty of 
Lisbon is a product of two decades of negotiations and policymaking. 
The Treaty of Lisbon- 2007-2009 
The Treaty of Lisbon, initially signed on December 13, 2007 has ascended 
the ladder of the prospective communitarization with respect to immigration 
issues. Failure of the European Constitution of 2004, due to rejection of the 
French and the Dutch voters in 2005, led to its replacement by the aforementioned 
Treaty. The latter document did not succeed in the 2008 ratification because the 
Irish electorate failed to accept its provisions. However, the Treaty of Lisbon 
passed the second referendum in 2009 and entered into force on December 1, 
2009 to the great benefit of the EU institutions. 
 The Treaty of Lisbon was a leap forward in the history of the development 
of a “common” immigration policy. It introduced a profound reform in the sphere 
61 
of illegal immigration. The Treaty of Lisbon confirmed a shared competence of 
the EU and the member states over immigration issues. This situation did not 
designate full legislative initiative to the European Commission. However, the 
Treaty of Lisbon shifted from unanimity to qualified majority voting in the 
European Council of Ministers and co-decision in the European Parliament.
 160
 
The latter institution already has an equal say with national ministers in the areas 
dealing with immigration, border controls, and visa issues. Nonetheless, the 
Treaty of Lisbon will eventually empower the European Parliament with more say 
in both legal and illegal migration measures.
161
 Qualified majority voting and co-
decision are already applicable in the legislative procedures in the illegal 
immigration field and will be extended to the legal migration legislative actions. 
This step in decision-making process debilitates voices of resentment of the 
member states‟ officials in certain migration legislations. The reforms in the area 
of freedom, security and justice have called for accelerated creation of “common” 
immigration and asylum policies. Under General Provisions, Article 2 notes:  
The Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and 
justice without internal frontiers, in which the free movement of 
persons is ensured in conjunction with appropriate measures with 
respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the 




In case of a “common” immigration policy, the enhanced process of decision 
making would allow the European Union and its member states to define the 
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common rules and conditions of immigration. The planned switch to qualified 
majority voting in the European Council of Ministers has furthered the ongoing, 
albeit gradual, progress of the communitarization of immigration policies. 
However, as Jörg Monar mentions, this process in policymaking had to be bought 
at the price of extending the British and Irish opt-out in the former third-pillar 
matters. Moreover, the Treaty did not remove “the tension between common 
objectives on the one hand and the protection of national competences on the 
other as this is exemplified by the maintenance of national control of values of 
admission under the new common migration policy.”
163
 
The Stockholm Program – 2010- 2014 
 Building on the Tampere Summit, the Hague Program, and the European 
Pact on Immigration and Asylum, the recent Stockholm Program, which was 
adopted by the EU heads of state and government in December 2009, focused on 
the citizens' interests and needs and the added value that the European Union has 
brought to its citizens. According to the European Council, fighting illegal 
immigration is one of top priorities of the Stockholm Program. The EU should 
improve coordination of its efforts and work on active partnership with the 
countries of origin and of transit in order to encourage the synergy between 
migration and development.
164
 It is noteworthy that the European Commission 
contributed greatly to the final framework of the Stockholm Program. In its 
Communication entitled An Area of Freedom, Security and Justice Serving the 
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Citizen: Wider freedom in a Safer Environment, the European Commission 
clearly emphasized that one of the challenges facing the EU would be a high 
number of illegal immigrants residing in Europe. The Stockholm Program 
incorporated such a concern with illegal foreigners and focused on “the citizens” 
as being the heart of Europe.
165
 The document‟s section entitled Better Controls 
on the Illegal Immigration mentions:  
The European Council is convinced that effective action against 
illegal immigration remains an essential counterpart to the 
development of a common policy on legal immigration. The fight 
against human trafficking in particular must remain a key priority 
for this purpose. It will be important to ensure that the newly 
adopted instruments in the area of return and sanctions against 
employers, as well as the operation of readmission agreements, are 




According to Carrera and Merlino, the Stockholm Program used the term “illegal” 
throughout the body of the document, which ascribes undocumented immigrants 
to criminal status.
167
 Moreover, the Stockholm Program focused on measures such 
as return, readmission and criminalization of solidarity. The final document 
omitted two recommendations by the European Commission‟s June 2009 
Communication: 1) the common EU standards on non-removable illegal 
immigrants and 2) the common guidelines for implementing regularization 
programs.
168
 In other words, the outcome of the Stockholm Program would 
contribute to the ongoing fight with illegal immigration through stricter border 
                                                 
165
 Carrera and Merlino, “Assessing EU Policy,” 3. 
166
 “The Stockholm Program: An open and secure Europe.” 
167
 I personally disagree with the scholars because I myself use the term „illegal‟ in my research. 
Incorporation of this word should not have a political or ethical connotation.  
168
 Carrera and Merlino, “Assessing EU Policy,” 4. 
64 
controls and better exchange of information on criminal and security issues 
increased police co-operation. 
The 2000s- Further Restrictive and Gradual Harmonization 
With the millennium, new Europe entered into a more intensified 
discourse about the future supranationalization of immigration policy. Restrictive 
management of illegal immigrants and tightened external borders have topped 
discussions among the member states and EU officials. Major treaty-amending 
documents and official European Council meetings or proposals have clearly 
projected two trends: the gradual, albeit stagnant, development of a “common” 
immigration policy; and incrementally a more restrictive nature of the member 
states and the EU institutions‟ approach to migration, supporting tight regulations 
against an illegal population. Despite increased power of the pro-immigrant 
European Commission, only those proposals restrictive in content managed to be 
adopted.
169
 That said, most of the member states have not shared the European 
Commission‟s liberal standpoint on immigration and thus lowered various 
proposals during negotiations in the European Council of Ministers.
170
 Therefore, 
directive proposals have undergone a most rigid change after the “9/11” in favor 
of more security- and control-related nature of migration policies.
171
 As Petra 
Bendel asserts, “communitarization of migration policies in the EU has, so far, 
concentrated excessively on the control of migration and on the combating of 
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 Matters of integration of migrants and attraction of 
special groups of immigrants have been of secondary importance.  
The 2000s opened more windows of opportunity for a comprehensive 
approach to the immigration management at the EU level due to such events as 
the “9/11,” the Madrid bombing in 2004, the Ceuta and Melilla incidents in 2005, 
and the London bombings in 2005. These particular events indisputably put 
immigration into the domain of security in Europe of the twenty-first century.
173
 
The process of creating a common area of freedom, security and justice at the EU 
level for all EU citizens has introduced distinction between “us” and “others.” In 
the minds of many policymakers, therefore, securitization of immigration is 
needed due to disharmony and chaos brought by migration.
174
  
Albeit not discussed in the body of the chapter, the EU has introduced 
several updates to it border control mechanism. The Visa Information System 
(VIS) was adopted upon the (European) Council Decision from 2004 
(2004/512/EC) in order to exchange visa data between member states which shall 
enable national authorities to enter and update visa data and to consult these data 
electronically.
175
 Moreover, the update of Schengen Information System (SIS) I to 
Schengen Information System (SIS) II by the Regulation (EC) 1987/2006 in 2006 
enhanced the goal to maintain “high level of security within the area of freedom, 
security and justice of the European Union by supporting the implementation of 
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policies linked to the movement of persons that are part of „the Schengen 
acquis.‟”
176
 However, in June 2009, the European Council of Ministers formally 




Further securitization of external border checks timely correlated with 
incidents in Southern Europe. EU officials and the European states began to 
pursue tougher border controls in the Mediterranean region, and linked the events 
to Islamic terrorism.
178
 The twenty-first century has not only continued to label 
immigrants as an economic threat, but also as a socio-cultural one. In addition, the 
recent world economic downturn has caused even more selective resolution to 
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 Following on the footsteps of the previous chapter, this section outlines 
national immigration laws and legalization acts introduced by the Spanish 
government in the period 1985-2010. First, I focus on legal documents, which are 
divided into three time periods: the 1980s, the 1990s, and the 2000s. Similarly to 
my chapter on the EU policy developments, I follow each subsection by a 
summary of activities undertaken in each decade. My objective is to shed light on 
Spain‟s alignment with EU objectives and the degree of influence that the EU has 
exercised on the Spanish government since the mid-1980s. 
Map 2 - Spain (with Ceuta and Melilla enclaves) 
              
Source: University of Texas Libraries 
Historically, Spain has been categorized as an emigration country. It 
transitioned from a net emigration to a net immigration state in the 1980s. After 
68 
General Francisco Franco‟s death in 1975, the economic boom fostered 
unprecedented levels of expansion in the late 1980s and subsequently reduced 
high levels of unemployment.
179
 The restoration of democracy in 1978 and 
accession to the European Community in 1986 notably contributed to a steady 
increase of legal and illegal immigration to Spain from less prosperous regions of 
the world, mainly North Africa, the Americas and Asia. Other factors that 
stimulated the growth of foreign population included the development of labor 
markets within informal sectors,
180
 the geographical proximity with the Maghreb 
countries, and lax immigration control mechanisms.
181
 
Table 1- Foreign-born population in Spain – municipal registered (1985-2009) 
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Sources: Francisco J. Duran Ruiz, “The Relationship between Legal Status, Rights and the Social 
Integration of the Immigrants,” The Center for Comparative Immigration Studies (October 2003); 
Instituto Nacional de Estatística [National Institute of Statistics]  
 
                        
In 2010, Spain was the eighth country in the world with the largest number 
of international migrants as a raw number of people.
182
 The foreign-born 
population residing in Spain increased almost twofold in a ten-year period: from 
241,971 in 1985 to 499,773 in 1995 respectively.183 According to the Instituto 
Nacional de Estatística [National Institute of Statistics], the number of foreign-
born immigrants reached 923,879 in 2000184 and over 5.6 million in 2009, 




As Soern Kern affirms in his article, the final figures representing 
immigrants in Spain refer to inscribed individuals who register at the municipal 
level. Regardless of their legal status, foreigners have an incentive to register 
because, under the Spanish law, anyone who does so is entitled to emergency 
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 Therefore, one can register with the municipality and be 
effectively an undocumented immigrant. According to the Ministerio de Trabajo e 
Inmigración [Ministry of Labor and Immigration], only about 4.2 million out of 
5.2 million inscribed immigrants in 2008 were legal residents.
 187
 Because illegal 
foreigners continue to distrust the government, many of them avoid registration. It 
is highly plausible that a number of undocumented immigrants is currently higher 
than one million.  
The 1980s – Top-Down Influence 
 Since the 1980s European countries have had their eyes on Spain 
regarding immigration issues, and especially after the country‟s accession to the 
European Community. Once this Southern European state joined the EC, it 
automatically became known as Europe‟s “gateway” for non-EC nationals. The 
Strait of Gibraltar‟s proximity to North Africa and the Canary Islands‟ 
geographical position were, and still are, portrayed as easy-access points for 
thousands of immigrants. Moreover, as Lydia Esteve González and Richard Mac 
Bride suggest, the second reason for the Community‟s worry about immigration 
to Spain was the ability of Latin American and some other nationals to obtain 
Spanish citizenship if they legally resided in Spain for a period of two years.
188
 
Thus, as I illustrate below, its first immigration law fulfilled EC obligations, 
whereas the first regularization measure compensated undocumented immigrants 
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with working and/or living permit due to the restrictive nature of the initial legal 
code.   
LO 7/1985 
Spain had no explicit immigration policy prior to 1985. There was no 
legislation regarding the treatment of non-national residents.
189
  The Spanish 
Constitution of 1978 contained only one reference to migration movements 
embedded in Article 13, which specified the basic constitutional regulation of 
immigrants. Rosa Aparicio Gómez and José María Ruiz de Huidobro De Carlos 
note that “the precept formulates a principle of restricted equivalence between 
nationals and non-nationals vis-à-vis the entitlement to, and exercise of, 
fundamental rights and public liberties.”
190
 The Spanish Constitution did not take 
immigration into account because at the time of its creation, immigration was a 
non-existing concern in Spain and the country was still an explorer of labor.   
What revolutionized the legal aspect of migration was the first Spanish 
immigration law, or Organic Law (Ley de Extranjería) 7/1985. The lawmakers 
ignored the issue of integration of migrants and focused mainly on the control of 
immigrants and external borders. The law made a clear and formal distinction 
between legal and illegal immigrants. EC nationals gained all the rights to reside 
and work in Spain, whereas non-EC nationals faced very limited privileges.
191
 For 
the first time in Spanish history, a legal framework introduced visa requirements 
for non-EC foreigners: those who intended to stay in Spain for longer than 90 
                                                 
189
 Calavita, Immigrants at the Margins, 27. 
190
 Rosa Aparicio Gómez and José María Ruiz de Huidobro De Carlos, “Report from Spain” in 
Modes of Migration, Regulation and Control in Europe, ed. Jeroen Doomernik and Michael Jandl 
(Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2008), 152. 
191
Calavita, Immigrants at the Margins, 28. 
72 
days needed to obtain residence and work permits.
192
 The law did not recognize 
permanent permits and thus introduced a highly demanding set of requirements 
for the renewal of temporary ones.
193
 This legal document, the first of its kind, 
placed emphasis on deportation and introduced the possibility of expulsion of 
illegal immigrants who did not have work permits and/or legal residence.
194
  
Aparicio Gómez and Ruiz de Huidobro De Carlos assess the law as “short-
sighted” by the Spanish legislators who were in charge of outlining the legal 
document.
195
 The law narrative consisted of only five pages in the Federal 
Bulletin, leaving details to be worked out through administrative channels.
196
 
Moreover, in-depth analysis of the law reveals the contingent inability of the 
legislators to foresee the country‟s transformation from a net emigration to a net 
immigration state. The unstable legal framework and insufficient resources for its 
management impacted the migratory flow in subsequent years.
197
 Implementation 
of the law did not halt an increasing number of illegal immigrants. Moreno 
Fuentes asserts that LO 7/1985 was nothing more than placing Spain as a 
gatekeeper of the EC southern border. The document‟s restrictiveness and focus 
on border controls did not correspond with the migratory processes that were 
affecting Spain at that time.
198
 
The Regularization Program of 1986 
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There are various reasons behind endeavoring to undertake a 
regularization program. Some of them include reduction of the underground 
economy; increase in tax and social security contributions; improvement of social 
and economic situation of immigrants; and control over undocumented 
population.
199
 Shortly afterwards, LO 7/1985 was followed by the first 
regularization program of 1986. Its primary objective was to solve the issue of a 
large number of undocumented immigrants living in Spain. It had little credibility 
in the eyes of illegal immigrants.
200
 Allegedly, 38,100 applications were accepted. 
Furthermore, during the implementation of this program, there was a large 
number of detentions, expelling illegal immigrants, and leaving them without an 
opportunity to obtain permits.
201
 
The 1980s- External Pressure with Weak Domestic Interests 
Although the 1980s symbolized Spain‟s unprecedented shift from an 
emigration to an immigration country, the inflow of immigrants was portrayed as 
a temporary phenomenon that filled in the bottom of occupational scale with 
cheap labor from abroad. Therefore, the low salience of immigration in the 
Spanish political agenda significantly contributed to “thoughtless acceptance of 
European policy objectives within the legislation implemented at the national 
level.”
202
 Many scholars writing on the history of the Spanish immigration law 
development have persuasively asserted that the accession to the European 
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Community pushed the Spanish government to pass its first immigration law
203
 in 
order to comply with EC border controls and an overall concern with a swelling 
number of immigrants in the Mediterranean region.  
Table 2- Major illegal immigration-related policy steps in the 1980s 
 




1985   LO 7/1985 The Schengen Agreements- June 
1986  The first 
regularization 
Program 














Spain - growing economy in the 




As mentioned, the European Community outlined its demands for the 
Spanish immigration law, which were not compatible with the realities of the 
migratory processes in Spain. Consequently, external rather than internal 
circumstances decisively impacted the content of the legal code. It is crucial to 
keep in mind that the Schengen Agreements, which obscured the interests of its 
signatory states,
204
 pursued external border controls and fought against illegal 
immigration. Meantime, the EC signed a first treaty-amending document, the 
Single European Act (SEA) in 1987, which underlined similar restrictive 
measures. EC officials successfully maneuvered to transfer Schengen and the 
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SEA objectives to the LO 7/1985 framework. Little understanding of the topic 
and lack of experienced domestic staff specializing in migration encouraged 
Europeanization of EC- defined restrictive policy direction. 
 The first regularization program of 1986 immediately succeeded LO 
7/1985. As many have remarked, the legalization act came into effect due to 
shortcomings of the latter law. Laura Huntoon writes that “a tightening of 
immigration to Spain could decrease the supply of unskilled labor in Spain and 
put a damper on economic growth if higher wages are needed to move Spaniards 
into unskilled occupations.”
205
 Such an undesirable impact on the job market was 
feared by those employers, who benefited from cheap labor in labor-intensive 
sectors, including tourism, construction, agriculture and industry. The 
regularization program was apparently an outcome of unfolding domestic 
demands. Despite a high unemployment rate among native Spaniards, the growing 
economy of the late 1980s generated jobs for unskilled workers, mainly filled by 
illegal immigrants. Many argue that the first amnesty aimed at getting statistical 
data on a number of foreigners living in Spain. As it turned out, the regularization 
program fulfilled national needs of private and public sectors. 
In summary, it is difficult to argue against the suggestion that LO 7/1985 
was almost entirely influenced by EC demands. In fact, the 1986 regularization 
program ran counter to the restrictive objectives of EC policies, because 
according to empirical and statistical data, such programs have usually led to 
further illegal migration. This statement challenges the strict nature of the Spanish 
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immigration law and EC objectives, which at the same time began to pave a way 
to the process of the development of a “common” immigration policy. Diana 
Mata-Codesal adds that the regularization programs, seen as “exceptional” 
measures, have been a way to bypass EC demands.
206
 Despite Spain‟s weak 
stance on immigration issues and its passive transposition of EC objectives, its 
government managed to address concerns related to illegal immigration at the 
national level by introducing the regularization program and thus posing a 
challenge to the EC framework.  
The 1990s – Top-Down and Bottom-Up Influences 
In the early 1990s, Spain recognized that immigration was not a temporary 
concern, as foreign visitors often chose the country as their permanent destination. 
Admitting that LO 7/1985 fell short of what a comprehensive immigration law 
should have looked like, implementation of visa requirements, two regularization 
programs, transposition of a few EU directives, and external border surveillance 
programs furthered the development of the Spanish immigration regime. As 
immigration became an increasingly discussed topic, many policymakers 
anticipated a new law in order to address the changing reality. By the end of the 
decade, the Spanish parliament began debating a bill that would revise the former 
immigration law through advocating integration as a way of incorporating 
immigrants into the Spanish society.
207
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The 1991 Visa Requirements 
 The so-called update to LO 7/1985 took place in May 1991, when the 
Spanish government imposed visa requirements for the first time on entrants from 
Morocco, Algiers, and Tunisia.
208
 Subsequently, in 1993, visitors from the 
Dominican Republic were also asked to obtain visas. At that time, these countries 
were recognized as sources of a large number of undocumented immigrants in 
Spain.
209
 The visa policy coincided with the expiration of agreements with 
Morocco and Tunisia for mutual elimination of the required documents. 
Beforehand, Spanish authorities maintained a lax stand on the implementation of 
border control policies, already targeted by LO 7/1985. Again, the European 
Community became an influential player in the formation of immigration policies. 
Because Spain looked forward to joining the Schengen Agreements in June 1992, 
one of its preconditions included the tightening of borders with the Maghreb 
countries.
210
 Consequently, the change in the visa policy led to reinforcement of 
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Map 3- Ceuta and Melilla 
 
Source: Maps of Net 
The Regularization Programs of 1991 and 1996 
 Shortly after, Spain implemented its second relevant act in June 1991, by 
granting three-year work and residence permits to 118,321 undocumented 
foreigners. This particular document targeted foreign workers who “were already 
in the country by May 15, 1991 and had an ongoing work contracts, or were self-
employed in legitimate enterprise, or had previously had a valid residence and 
work permit.”
211
 It is noteworthy that this measure was a product of domestic 
politics, which resulted in a pressure from pro-immigration groups for a broad 
amnesty.
212
 Another rationale behind this second legalization was 
overwhelmingly based on the visa policy. Over 40 percent of applicants were 
                                                 
211
 Moreno Fuentes, “The Evolution of Immigration.” 
212
 Cornelius, “Spain: The Uneasy Transition,” 412. 
79 
Moroccans. This political leeway demonstrated that the document came from the 
domain of foreign policy toward Morocco.
213
 
 As a brief interface, it is important to mention again that the European 
Community transformed into the European Union in 1993. The creation of the 
Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), with its new competencies, remained a hybrid of 
intergovernmentalist and supranationalist pillars. Initially, the JHA was 
envisioned as substantially intergovernmental, allowing for any future 
communitarization of its activities. As early as in the first half of the 1990s, the 
Spanish parliament and the government articulated the need to join Schengen and 
to become an active player in migration politics at the EU level as a way to 
participate in the future communitarization of immigration policies.
214
 
 Following the second regularization process, another significant 
legalization act closely connected to the Regulations for Foreigners (the Royal 
Decree 155/1996), was introduced in 1996. According to Cornelius, this measure 
was a response to the February 1996 change in the rules concerning work permits, 
by extending their duration.
215
  It legalized over 21,300 out of 25,128 applicants 
by issuing five-year residence permits.
216
 It aimed at granting permits to those 
immigrants who lost them due to the restrictive character of the preceding acts. 
The Royal Decree 155/1996 took one of the most significant steps toward the 
permanent status of immigrants.
217
 A foreigner who could prove that he had lived 
legally in Spain for six consecutive years, by renewing his temporary permits, 
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could apply for permanent residence status. This document advocated extended 
rights to foreigners and moved the Spanish immigration policies toward a more 
liberal approach, focusing on integration and immigrant rights. Thanks to the 
Royal Decree 155/1996, a parliamentary commission debated a new immigration 
law in 1998 that would substitute LO 7/1985 and contextualize the liberal spirit of 
the mid-1990s.  
The Integrated System of Exterior Vigilance (SIVE) - 1999 
 In January 1998 a chief executive officer of the Spanish national police 
(from the Partido Popular) introduced implementation of an enforcement project 
called “Plan Sur.” The project aimed at “strengthening of border controls, a more 
intensive surveillance of air- and seaports, a tightening of deportation procedures 
and a closer cooperation with Moroccan and Algerian authorities.”
218
 It 
invigorated a harsher stance on unlawful entrances of immigrants from North 
Africa. The following year, the Integrated System of Exterior Vigilance (SIVE) 
was approved as a mean to control the maritime border more efficiently. SIVE 
was launched with a budget of about € 150 million for the period 1999-2004. The 
funding supported maritime surveillance operations at a distance of 10 to 25 
kilometers from shore.
219
 At first, the only region under surveillance was the 
Strait of Gibraltar, which is the southernmost coastline of Spain. It was 
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subsequently extended to the east and west of the Spanish mainland. Today it 
covers the entire Andalusian coast and some parts of Canary Islands‟ coasts.
220
  
Map 4- Coastlines covered by SIVE 
                   
 
 Source: Jørgen Carling, “The Merits and Limitations of Spain's High-Tech Border      
Control,” Migration Information Source (June 2007). 
 
Moreover, the system has succeeded in slowing down the rate of increase of the 
number of boats in the controlled regions. According to Jørgen Carling, the total 
number of unauthorized migrants intercepted along the coasts of mainland Spain 
in the 1990s reached 17,000 in 2000. From 2002 to 2004, the number dropped to 
9,000 -10,000 interceptions per year. Moreover, the number was less than 5,000 
in 2005, and then jumped to 31,000 in 2006.
221
 However, it did not stop 
immigrants from finding other ways of entering Spain. Critics of such a 
controversial system have voiced their concerns that immigrants have nonetheless 
found other routes to enter the coastal lines. Also, fatality figures have increased 






since the installation of SIVE. Regardless of its unfulfilled promise to stop 
unauthorized immigration, its establishment pronounced a new position of the 
country in the European Union as an active proponent of the fight against 
inflowing undocumented immigrants and as a supporter of bilateral negotiations 
with the sending countries. 
The 1990s - Prevailing Mixture of European and Domestic Demands 
 The early 1990s pronounced the ongoing Community and unfolding 
domestic pressure, which favored integration-oriented policymaking and stricter 
external border controls. The visa requirements were triggered by two factors: 
direct EC/EU influence and the Europe-wide economic downturn in the early 
1990s.  In the interim, the Schengen Agreements relied on strictly 
intergovernmental cooperation framework; they emphasized interests of the 
signatory countries that found fulfillment in Spain‟s external border controls and 
visa policies. Namely, the EU had resolutely managed to promote Schengen 
objectives.  
Table 3– Major illegal immigration-related steps in the 1990s 





1990   Fall of Communism 








program – June 
Schengen II 
 
Europe-wide economic recession 
of the early 1990s 
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1992   Spain signs the Schengen 
Agreements in June 







































 Approval of “Plan Sur” and SIVE by the conservative government is a 
success story. The surveillance system not only aimed at tightening the Spanish 
maritime border, but also at fulfilling obligations vis-à-vis Europe.
222
 Albeit a 
national innovative system, SIVE has emphasized Spain‟s concern with the 
impact of the inflow of African immigrants to the European Union. Fauser 
pinpoints that the Spanish government had articulated the need to become a 
member of Schengen as a way to participate in the communitarization of 
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 Visa requirements, “Plan Sur” and SIVE, could be 
described as official initiatives of support for the EU-wide policy. As I already 
remarked, Spain voiced its support for a “common” immigration policy as early 
as two decades ago, but only recently (in the late 1990s onward) turned „theory‟ 
into „practice‟. 
 Spain's compliance with EU policies was noticeable in the country's 
adaptation of many EU rules throughout the 1990s. Nonetheless, the two 
regularization programs and the 1998 parliamentary talks about a more liberal 
approach undermined the Partido Popular‟s enactment of “Plan Sur” and SIVE. 
Furthermore, such measures derailed from the EU vision of an overly restrictive 
“common” immigration policy that would, first and foremost, fight against illegal 
immigration and would favor social exclusion of illegal immigrants.  
 Esteve González and Mac Bride assert that the 1990s witnessed an overall 
attempt by the EU member states to reduce the rights of foreigners. Only such 
countries Italy, France and Spain intuitively aimed at extending such privileges.
224
 
In the early 1990s, the Spanish government under former Prime Minister Felipe 
González kept a low-profile immigration policy by avoiding public uprisings and 
inflated expectations.
225
 Throughout years, the socialist government reflected 
support for less radical stance on immigration and more pro-integration policies.  
 The urgency to solve issues concerning undocumented immigrants 
appeared to have been a powerful incentive to introduce further reforms at the 
national level. The 1991 and 1996 liberal regularization programs antagonized 
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certain European leaders. However, according to national supporters of 
legalization acts, their introduction was necessary at times because such programs 
fulfill certain demands of the public and private sectors which cannot be met by 
the EU.  
The 2000s – More Pronounced Bottom-Up Influence 
 The formation of national preferences has become more pronounced since 
the 2000s. The decade introduced new challenges, which have been defining the 
immigration policy framework at both the EU and national levels in restrictive 
terms. The mid-2000s economic boom attracted cheap labor from abroad, which 
rapidly increased the size of foreign population living in Spain. The 2000s 
initiated a more restrictive approach to illegal immigration. The first amendment 
to LO 7/1985 embodied a paradox. Subsequently, its further reforms, LO 8/2000, 
LO 14/2003 and LO 2/2009, focused on a more ferocious approach to illegal 
migration, tighter border controls, repatriation of illegal immigrants, and 
cooperation with third world countries in order to control the inflow of 
undocumented foreigners. Again, three Spanish regularization programs served as 
countermeasures to the restrictiveness of EU objectives.  
LO 4/2000 
 Despite the recent securitization of immigration issues, LO 4/2000 
introduced “the most liberal law on the rights of foreigners in Europe.”
226
 It 
formalized the long-envisioned goal to effectively integrate immigrants. The 
law‟s objectives stemmed from the Royal Decree 155/1996, which initiated 
reforms of LO 7/1985. The document was an important landmark in the 
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construction of the liberal immigration legislation in Spain. It is crucial to note 
that both the Royal Decree and LO 4/2000 were advocated by the Partido 
Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE), a left-wing political party. In the months 
leading up to the approval of the new immigration law, the Spanish parliament 
hosted impassioned debates between socialists and conservatives. The right-wing 
political party, the Partido Popular (PP), introduced 112 amendments for the bill 
of 77 articles.
227
 The group affirmed that the proposals were too liberal and did 
not follow restrictive EU objectives, mainly outlined in the spirit of the Tampere 
Summit of 1999. However, due to the lack of an absolute majority in the 
parliament, the PP failed to implement its revisions. 
While the harmonization of immigration laws at the EU level was based 
on the laws of most restrictive countries, the socialist government in power, due 
to its integration-friendly approach to foreigners,
228
 carried out reforms to deliver 
more rights to foreigners. LO 4/2000 extended certain privileges to illegal 
immigrants that were once reserved for legal residents only. This phenomenon 
meant that all immigrants, regardless of their legal status, who registered in the 
municipal census, gained the following rights: freedom to demonstrate, strike, and 
participate in associations; right to education; access to emergency and regular 
public health care; right to housing assistance and basic services.
229
 Additionally, 
undocumented residence and work did not constitute substantial reasons for 
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expulsion from Spanish territory.
230
  I can state it differently and assert that the 
new law excluded deportation of undocumented migrants. 
LO 8/2000 
The premature death of LO 4/2000 occurred after the Partido Popular‟s 
electoral victory in March 2000. The conservative party, dissatisfied with the new 
law, revised it with LO 8/2000 before the end of the year. To many this 
transformation introduced a restrictive period of immigration. LO 8/2000 outlined 
several alternations to the previous legal framework. It continued to encourage 
measures that favored integration, but only concerning immigrants who had a 
legal status. The PP denied illegal immigrants the right to association, 
demonstration and strikes. Full access to education remained mainly unaltered, 
with one exception: non-obligatory education would only by guaranteed for 
resident immigrants. Moreover, the right to public health care also stayed 
unchanged. Unlike the grounds provided by LO 4/2000, illegal residence and 
work constituted sufficient reasons for expulsion.
231
 LO 8/2000 reintroduced 
deportation as an effective tool to deal with undocumented immigrants. Calavita 
notes that the law was designed to “bring Spain into compliance with the EU 
agreement at Tampere in 1999 and the Schengen Agreements, which the PP 
claimed had been violated by the permissiveness of the LO 4/2000.”
232
 Meantime, 
the conservative government also approved a plan for integrating foreign 
immigrants called the Global Program of Regulation and Coordination of 
Immigration in Spain (GRECO), which was active throughout the period of 2000-
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2004.  Even though this plan emphasized the integration of immigrants as a 
fundamental element of a “healthy” immigration policy, it nonetheless aligned 
with the restrictive approach of LO 8/2000.
233
 It limited integration services to 
immigrants who were paying social security and income taxes.
234
 The plan clearly 
favored rhetoric of expulsion of illegal immigrants and reinforcement of external 
border controls. 
The Regularization Program of 2000 
 The catalyst of the 2000 regularization program was restrictiveness of LO 
8/2000. It opened doors to deportations en masse. This particular spike in 
expulsions fueled widespread protests by pro-immigration groups.
235
 The 
extraordinary measure granted work and residence permits to 163,913 out of 
247,598 applicants, a much higher number than the preceding programs.
236
 
Legalized immigrants received one-year temporary residence/work permits. One 
of the many conditions included proof of residency in Spain since June 1, 1999.
237
 
Again, despite the reticent attitude of EU officials towards national legalization 
acts, Spanish policymakers continued to perceive regularization as a way to 
answer domestic demands, including the fight against marginalization, 
exploitation of undocumented immigrants, and demand for unskilled labor.
238
 As 
Calavita shows, integration policies in Spain have not been very effective and the 
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immigrant‟s marginality is structured into the society. Thus, any political move 
toward extending immigrant rights, such as regularization programs, has been 
aimed at reducing the codified “otherness” of foreigners.
239
 
The Regularization Program of 2001 
Following LO 8/2000, the Partido Popular introduced an additional 
regularization program in 2001, mainly due to continuous protests on the streets 
and in the Spanish Parliament.
240
 Qualifying applicants had to prove presence in 
Spain before January 23, 2001. The legalization process granted one-year 
temporary residence permits to about 243,790 out of 361,289 undocumented 
immigrants.
241
 After the 2001 regularization program, the right-wing government 
announced that it would not offer any other legalization acts in order to avoid the 
“call effect,”
242
 which was interpreted as a magnet for more undocumented 
immigration.  
LO 14/2003 
 Despite the 2001 amnesty, the Partido Popular continued to make illegal 
immigration a top priority. An increasing number of migrants, instances of human 
trafficking, and smuggling networks had invigorated the party‟s reformative 
sentiment. To the bewilderment of many, the Partido Socialista Obrero Español 
signed the new law. LO 14/2003 did not change the hostility exhibited by the 
conservative government toward illegal foreigners. Some of the law‟s goals 
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included the efficient expulsion of illegal residents, entry controls at airports, 
limited rights for the families of immigrants and inability to regularize status in 
case of continuous illegal permanence in the country.
243
 Controversially, the 
document allowed the police to access information on foreign residents who 
registered in the municipal census. Such an extreme revision discouraged many 
immigrants from participating in the census, jeopardizing their access to health 
care and social benefits.
244
 LO 14/2003 continued to target illegal immigration 
and exercise external border controls; its objectives correlated with a European 
view of a “fortress Europe.”  
The Regularization Program of 2005 
 Following the terrorist bombings of Madrid mass transit, and the 
mishandling of that crisis by the conservative government, the 2004 general 
elections welcomed the Partido Socialista Obrero Español as the victorious 
political party. Although the socialist party did not push for a reform of the recent 
immigration law, it introduced another regularization program in 2005. The party 
in power decided to align with the needs of national employers.
245
 The recent 
regularization act differed slightly from the preceding ones. Employers had to 
submit an application on behalf of undocumented workers. Once approved, a 
worker would get a one-year residence and work authorization permit that would 
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be renewed for up to two years.
246
 Another main requirement stated that the 
applicant had to have lived in Spain as of August 2004. Similarly to the previous 
programs, immigrants needed to register in the municipal census. Also, as Table 4 
shows, the 2005 regularization process constituted the largest one so far. 
Table 4– Extraordinary regularization programs, 1986-2005 








1986 - 38,100  
1991 110,100 108,321 98.4% 
1996 25,128 21,300 84.8% 
2000 247,598 163,913 66.2% 
2001 361,289 243,790 67.5% 
2005 691,655 575,827 83.1% 
 
Source: Ministerio del Interior [Ministry of the Interior]; Ministerio de Trabajo e Inmigración      
[Ministry of Labour and Immigration]. Reproduced from Aparicio Gómez & Ruiz de Huidobro de 
Carlos, “Report from Spain.”  
 
 The regularization program did not avoid domestic and international 
criticism. Despite the terrorist attacks in Madrid (2004) and growing public 
discontent with a large number of immigrants,
 
the socialist government went 
ahead and introduced this measure. The Partido Popular continued to emphasize 
on the “call effect.” International criticism came mainly from other member states 
and EU officials. Although the most recent legalization act was considered a 
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positive step by the Council of Europe and the United Nations, it was criticized by 
Brussels officials, as well as by Germany and France.
247
 Because of the 
movement facilities afforded by the Schengen Agreements, they foresaw 
regularization as a magnet for illegal immigrants not only to Spain, but also to 
other states.
248
 The fact that Spain did not consult with other EU countries prior to 
implementing the new regulation shocked many observers and EU policymakers. 
Even though there has not been a unified position on implementing regularization 
programs, attitudes towards such acts have varied from country to country,
249
 
which can largely be described as opposition and skepticism. 
LO 2/2009 
As Spain experienced a shift from an economic boom to an economic bust 
in 2007-2008, the persistent inflow of immigrants pressured the socialist 
government to consider an immigration reform, which would align with socio-
economic challenges facing the country. The Partido Socialista Obrero Español 
introduced a new, more restrictive law. LO 2/2009 came into force in December 
2009. The document incorporated all EU directives, which were introduced since 
LO 4/2000 came into force. According to LO 2/2009, these directives were 
reflected in the Spanish legal system.
250
 The amending document increased a 
period for detaining illegal migrants from 40 to 60 days before deporting them 
back to their home countries. Taking into consideration the Directive 2009/52 
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regarding sanctions applicable to employers of illegal immigrants, employers of 
undocumented workers or individuals encouraging illegal migration would be 
fined up to €10,000, whereas human trafficking would be fined up to €100,000.
251
  
The 2000s- Politicization of Immigration, Selective EU’s Influence and Spain’s 
Impact on the “Common” Immigration Policy Rhetoric 
 
Indisputably, socio-economic and political events influenced the 
development of more restrictive policies. The recent decade finally formed well-
defined domestic interests with respect to illegal immigration and external border 
controls. Out of the steps of the immigration law development covered thus far, 
the short-lived LO 4/2000 was the only anomaly. Immigrant integration proved to 
be a priority for the socialist government in its effort to meet the interests of 
lobbying groups (NGOs, employer organizations, trade unions, churches, etc.) 
who benefited from the incorporation of foreigners into mainstream society. All 
further law amending documents had been more conservative due to the presence 
of acute socio-economic problems. 
Table 5 – Major illegal immigration-related steps in the 2000s 
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2010   LO 2/2009 Economic/financial downturn 
 
 Decisively, recent circumstances and events have influenced the public 
opinion and the government‟s stance on illegal immigration. Shortly after the 
introduction of LO 4/2000, violent riots broke out in El Ejido. This unfortunate 
event not only ignited anti-immigrant revolts, but also placed immigration on the 
socio-political agenda. As the general election approached, the Partido Popular 
politicized the event for its electoral value.
252
 The conservative government 
capitalized on the public‟s discontent with immigration and linked it to the 
upcoming elections and legislation. This publicized tragedy benefited the right-
wing, which found solid ground to further restrict the immigration law.
253
 
 El Ejido represented a domestic issue that influenced the outcome of the 
immigration reform. Yet another factor that gave a green light to implement LO 
8/2000 was the Tampere Summit. The latter official meeting of EU heads of state 
and government emphasized the need to develop a “common” immigration 
policy, which would strengthen border controls and expel illegal immigrants. 
                                                 
252




Former Prime Minister Aznar took advantage of the flexibility of European 
guidelines, which left room for interpretations, and of the so-called “escape to 
Europe” in order to justify his actions. This instance represented the Spanish 
government‟s nature of selectiveness of EU objectives. The Tampere Summit 
document introduced a non-binding list of objectives that was used (due to 
domestic interests) as a legitimate excuse. Zapata-Barrero mentions that the PP 
abused the argument that the Tampere Summit “forced Spain to become more 
restrictive (something which was obviously false but that public opinion believed 
without any counter-argumentation by other actors).”
254
 As Fauser asserts, “it 
[Tampere] gave a reason to act for a new bill and thereby to introduce the issue in 
the election campaign.”
255
 The PP combined European demands with its domestic 
interests in combat against illegal migration.
256
 
Despite Spain‟s visible selection among EU objectives, the supranational 
institutions continued to sporadically influence the Spanish government. Several 
Council directives
257
 in the area of immigration policies, such as recognition of 
decisions on expulsion among the member countries (D 2001/40) and a common 
definition on facilitating unauthorized entry, stay and residence (2002/90) were 
approved in the EU and then transposed within the Spanish legal code, as 
observed in the text of LO 14/2003.
258
 Recently, the Spanish government 
supported the so-called Return Directive (D 2008/115) of 2008, standardizing the 
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conditions for expelling illegal immigrants throughout Europe.
259
 The Directive 
on employers‟ sanctions (D 2009/52) has prohibited the employment of illegal 
third-country nationals in order to combat illegal immigration. Nonetheless, “it 
lays down minimum common standards on sanctions and measures to be applied 
in the Member States against employers who infringe that prohibition.”
260
  
The 2001 Council Regulation (EC) 539/2001 introduced lists of “the third 
countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing external 
borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement.”
261
 Because 
EU regulations are law-binding documents, Spain applied visa requirements to 
Latin American countries: Cuba and Peru in 2001, Colombia in 2002, Ecuador in 
2003,
 262
 and Bolivia in 2007,
263
 just as outlined in the official document.  
The Spanish Presidency of European Council of Ministers in 2002 (and 
also its Presidency in 2010) outlined the country‟s intention to place immigration 
issues at the top of the EU agenda.
264
 The Presidency was used as a platform to 
coordinate the member states on issues related to this Spanish dilemma.
265
 The 
Seville Summit in 2002 allowed the government to outline such objectives as 
illegal immigration, human trafficking, immigrant-related criminality and external 
border controls. Its conclusions were seen as a mere continuation of the Tampere 
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objectives. As Fauser asserts, “this course for further development of restriction 
and control on migration in the EU was reflected in the Spanish initiative for a 
directive on the communication of passenger data by carriers.”
266
 The Spanish 
proposal was turned into a directive (D 2004/82) at the end of April 2004. The 
Directive aimed at harmonizing carriers‟ financial penalties provided for by the 
member states. 
Furthermore, the establishment of FRONTEX in 2004 has its roots in 
Spanish advocacy. The central government has actively promoted FRONTEX by 
voicing the need for more resources and commitment from the EU member states. 
After unfortunate events in Ceuta and Melilla, Spain sought a European response 
to the crisis and encouraged measures to deal with sending countries. The Global 
Approach, approved by the European Council of December 2005, had a clear 
Spanish stamp on it, too. Its three premises were: “solidarity among member 
states, partnership with third countries and protection of emigrants, especially the 
most vulnerable groups.”
267
 Spain pursued an agenda of measures, policies and 
instruments, already included in the Tampere Summit and the Hague Program, in 
order to advance the construction of a “common” immigration policy.
268
 
Moreover, since 2006, Spain‟s multiple agreements with African sending 
countries have placed emphasis on the external dimension of a “common” 
immigration policy.  
The convergence of Spanish-EU policies has been widely accredited to the 
Partido Popular as a major player in negotiating agreements. As Johansson-
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Nogués writes, “the very success of the PP‟s strategy is well illustrated by the fact 
that immigration now occupies a fairly central place on the European agenda as a 
security concern.”
269
  The recent years have also shown the socialist government‟s 
harsher stance on illegal immigration. Recent LO 2/2009 continues the restrictive 
pathway of the Spanish immigration stance. It was implemented shortly after the 
Lisbon Treaty, which brought in hope for  a long-envisioned “common” 
immigration policy. The recent national immigration law converged with EU 
objectives. In other words, a “common” immigration policy might resemble the 
Spanish law in many of its aspects, considering the fact that the Spanish 
government has lately played a considerable role in outlining migration 
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Chapter 5: Applicability of Theoretical Frameworks 
 
 
 In this chapter, I begin with definitions of the birth and the process of the 
“common” immigration policy development within the lines of neofunctionalism 
and supranationalism. On the one hand, the neofunctionalist “spillover” 
mechanism, from economic integration to political integration, may help to 
explain the initiation of the interstate cooperation in the mid-1980s. On the other 
hand, supranationalism may help to understand the incremental delegation of the 
member states‟ sovereign control over illegal immigration and border controls to 
the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the European Court of 
Justice. Furthermore, I introduce an intergovernmentalist critique of both theories. 
Ultimately, I test the relevance of liberal intergovernmentalism in the case study 
of Spain, by applying Moravcsik‟s three-tier mechanism of EU negotiations. I 
examine Spain‟s impact on EU initiatives through national preference formation, 
interstate bargaining and institutional choice.  
Applicability of Neofunctionalism- Rationale behind Initiation of a 
“Common” Immigration Policy 
 
Many European integration students and experts persuasively suggest that 
the European immigration regime, which emerged in the mid-1980s, was a child 
of neofunctionalism. Many of them, including Mutimer, Neimann and Schmitter, 
claim that the Single European Act‟s commitments to the abolition of internal 
borders and the free movement of EC citizens compelled the member states to 
subsequently coordinate their national migration policies,
 270 
which they have 
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done only to a degree. By failing to harmonize immigration policies, the states 
would have jeopardized the EC developments in the economic sphere. Thus, in 
the neofunctionalist scenario, the states jumped on the bandwagon in the fear that 
abstaining from a future “common” immigration policy would negatively 
influence the Single Market.
271
 Leticia Delgado Godoy asserts that “the objective 
of creating a unified market favored the consideration of immigration as a 
question that should be tackled at a European level.”
272
 Moreover, Brochmann 
adds that “the enhanced freedom of movement within the Single Market has 
stimulated a tendency towards greater cooperation and coordination between EU 
member countries in this [immigration] field.”
273
  
Another scholar, Lu, argues that the member states‟ decision to cooperate 
on external border controls and migration policies followed from functional 
“spillover,” which started with the call for free movement of labor,
274
 but was 
finalized with the internal market proposals. Lu further supports “spillover” by 
defining Articles 8A, 8B, and 100C of the Treaty of the European Union as 
representing “spillover” of problems from economic integration to visa policy and 
citizenship and then to the issue of migration.
275
 Alan Butt Philip also recognizes 
supplementary instances of neofunctionalist “spillover.” A slow and reluctant 
association of the EU institutions with more and more immigration issues (visa 
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From a neofunctionalist point of view then, the determinants behind the 
harmonization of these policies included a need to maximize success and benefits 
of removed internal borders and the freedom of movement.
277
 Therefore, this 
observation has led many scholars to argue that functional “spillover” has been 
the root cause of further integration of immigration policies. To recall, functional 
“spillover” refers to a situation in which harmonization in one segment of 
policymaking spills over to cooperate activities in other sectors, which are closely 
linked to the former integrated sector.
278
 The initial plan to demolish internal 
borders and apply the free movement of persons (SEA) coordinated one segment 
of policymaking at the EC level and spilled over to the immigration policy sector. 
Anthony Messina and Colleen Thouez present three independent 
arguments picturing the linkage between the completion of the Single Market and 
the initiation of the immigration policy harmonization.
279
 The first argument is 
that “the failure to harmonize national policies on non-EU immigration threatened 
to diminish the overall economic returns of the Single Market, as nationals of 
some member states were disadvantaged in seeking employment in the labor 
markets of other member states who pursue relatively permissive policies toward 
less costly non-EU labor.”
280
 Differing immigration policies in the Single Market 
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would be against economic rationality. Another argument says that non-
harmonized immigration policies threatened to distort trade competition within 
the internal market, where the member states with liberal immigration policies 
gained a competitive economic edge over the member states with more restrictive 
policies.
281
 The last argument assumes that the abolition of internal borders and 
lack of cooperation to harmonize national immigration policies would endanger 
adequacy of the member states to protect them against international terrorism and 
drug trafficking.
282
 Neofunctionalists take such arguments into consideration by 
asserting that absence of internal borders expanded “spillover” process into the 
immigration sphere. 
Moreover, “spillover” from the Single Market into the “common” 
immigration policy rhetoric initiated years of the cooperative development of a 
harmonized approach to immigration. Neofunctionalists would argue that the 
above-described official documents have shown clear empirical evidence of 
functional “spillover” in a process. The latter type of “spillover” has gained 
credibility in additional instances of political and cultivated “spillovers.” 
Particularly, the theory of supranationalism accredits the phenomenon of the two 
latter “spillovers.”  
 With respect to functional “spillover,” once the member states understood 
the costs of national immigration policies, they began to push for harmonized 
policies, targeting external border controls and restrictive legislations against 
illegal migrants. The EU heads of state and government have incrementally and 






voluntarily upgraded control over these issues to the supranational level. Backed 
by selected data from the 1980s, neofunctionalists found rationale behind the 
puzzling question of why the member states began to harmonize their 
immigration policies.  
Applicability of Supranationalism- Empowerment of the EU Institutions by 
the EC/EU Treaties 
 
Supranationalism has built its arguments on the neofunctionalist 
framework, mainly because neofunctionalism has endorsed supranational 
governance and has served as the basis theory for supranationalism. Once 
functional “spillover” affected integration of immigration policies, further 
developments in the field had enshrined more power to the EC/EU institutions 
with respect to policymaking at the EU level.  
As argued by some, the Single European Act induced a neofunctionalist 
behavior, which was halted in the 1960s and the 1970s by unfavorable 
constituents. Again, neofunctionalists see the SEA as an engine of harmonization. 
Subsequently after neofunctionalism, supranationalism took the lead role in 
defining the evolution of a “common” immigration policy. Messina and Thouez 
mention that when an interstate cooperation grows, the member states engage in 
common strategies and plans to solve mutual problems.
283
 In the case of 
immigration policies, one can argue that a failure to control the augmenting 
inflow of illegal immigrants and “porous” external borders has accredited the 
supranationalist approach, where technocratic EU authorities would, 
independently of the member states‟ interference, resolve domestic problems of 
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the nation states. Anand Menon and Stephen Weatherill would agree with the 
latter statement. They assert that the supranational institutions have in fact helped 
to correct national efficiency failings and have served as supplementary aid to the 
member states.
284
 National control over asylum and migration policies has 




The Single European Act introduced only minimized supranationalization 
in the sphere of migration policies. The White Paper‟s proposals, dealing with the 
free movement of people, fell under the European Commission and the European 
Court of Justice‟s competencies. However, the approval of an extended control 
over illegal immigration was still a subject to unanimity, where any EC head of 
state and government could veto a proposal. Some of the member states‟ 
disagreement with the European Commission‟s liberal Guidelines for a 
Community Policy on Migration revealed persisting reluctance to cede 
sovereignty over such sensitive areas. The EC member states preferred 
intergovernmental cooperation outside of the SEA framework, undermining the 
European Commission‟s enduring goal of a common approach at that time. 
Therefore it would be futile to attribute any meaningful supranational 
achievements to the SEA. Nonetheless, increased attention to the immigration 
field, presumably caused by functional “spillover,” paved a way to the 
harmonization of national policies.  
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 Unlike the SEA, the Treaty of the European Union formalized the 
development of a “common” immigration policy. The European Commission, the 
European Parliament and the European Court of Justice continued to exercise 
marginal role in decision making, while the European Council of Ministers 
emerged as a dominant actor, yet still with unanimous decision-making 
mechanism. The European Commission‟s powers were also constrained.
286
 
Nonetheless, comparing to the pre-Maastricht period of no initiative power of the 
European Commission, the TEU awarded the institution with shared initiative 
under the third pillar (the Justice and Home Affairs).
287
 The European Parliament 
continued to be an institution informed about discussions and sporadically asked 
for recommendations.
288
 Although the European Parliament‟s role did not change 
from consultation to co-decision, Brochmann notes that the institution has 
nonetheless become more active in the migration realm since the Treaty.
289
 The 
European Commission‟s weak authoritative structure was also compensated with 
increasing level of activity in the immigration policy regime,
290
 mainly in in-
between treaties‟ periods. 
To sum up, the legal basis for the harmonization of immigration issues 
introduced by the Treaty of the European Union continued to be weak; it did not 
involve any binding regulations or directives presented in the text. Three „soft‟ 
policy instruments, characteristic for the third pillar, were available for the 
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member states. They included joint positions, which had no binding power; joint 
actions, which depended on unanimity; and conventions, which required 
ratification at the national level.
291
 
 Achievements of the Treaty of Amsterdam more noticeably fueled the 
“common” immigration policy development. The transfer of the JHA from the 
third to the first pillar formalized collective commitment to a potential, “common” 
immigration policy. The JHA pillar shift maintained unanimity in the European 
Council of Ministers as the basis of decision making for at least five years. 
Gebbes comments that “the member states imported the comfort blanket of 
intergovernmentalism and constrained the scope for supranational 
institutionalization.”
292
 Referring to the European Parliament, the Treaty of 
Amsterdam gave it more expansive privileges. The institution gained a 
consultative power for the first five years after the document; after this time 
period, co-decision would follow. Similarly, the European Commission would 
increase its powers in 2004. It would gain a sole right to initiate legislations in the 
immigration realm. However, until then, the latter EU institution would share the 
legislative power with the European Council of Ministers.
293
 The European Court 
of Justice would have “the jurisdiction to rule on the interpretation of Title III A 
on a request from the Council of Ministers, Commission, or a member state.”
294
  
  The Treaty of Nice harmonized Title IV by introducing qualified majority 
voting (QMV) in most decisions in the area of visa, asylum, and immigration. 
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According to The Treaty of Nice and Seville Declarations 2002 White Paper, 
more favorable Community procedures would apply. The right to initiate would 
rest with the European Commission, while the European Council of Ministers 
would take a decision to move to QMV and co-decision with the European 
Parliament.
295
 It is important to state that qualified majority voting aimed at 
coming into force (if agreed by the European Council of Ministers) five years 
after the Treaty of Nice‟s implementation (2009). According to the previously 
mentioned document, the member states would unanimously decide, as of May 1, 
2004, whether to extend qualified majority voting and co-decision to such 
sensitive measures as illegal immigration and the freedom of movement of third 
country nationals within the European Union.
296
 As of today, QMV, promised by 
the Treaty of Nice in certain immigration areas, has not yet been implemented. 
Nonetheless, institutionalists have noticed significant achievements reflected in 
the Treaty of Nice, with respect to the illegal immigration area. 
 Some say that the recent Treaty of Lisbon moved forward the over two-
decade-long process of the development of a “common” immigration policy. The 
Treaty clearly referred to an ultimately legally-binding “common” immigration 
policy. The document outlined a potential transfer of decision making in the 
migration sphere to qualified majority voting in the European Council of 
Ministers and to co-decision in the European Parliament. The Treaty concretized 
the “common” immigration policy rhetoric applied by the European Union and 
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shared by the member states. Additionally, it replaced the three pillars with a 
single legal framework. The planned substitution of unanimity with qualified 
majority voting would point to a partial power transfer. As a reluctant state loses 
its right to veto, a proposal passes in the European Council of Ministers by 
majority voting. 
Intergovernmentalist Challenge to Neofunctionalism 
Albeit neofunctionalist explanations of the immigration harmonization 
pattern appear convincingly sound, what alternative answer to the 1980s events 
could confront the institutionalist assumption? Some scholars agree with the 
neofunctionalist “spillover” effect as the determinant of the immigration policy 
harmonization in the 1980s; others discredit it by pinpointing underlying 
intergovernmental patterns. Again, neofunctionalists perceive the rise of interest 
in the harmonization of immigration policies as functional “spillover” from the 
economic cooperation. Mutual effort in the immigration area stemmed from a 
“quasi-inevitable byproduct of the expanding Single Market‟s rules.
297
 The 
persistent lack of harmonized immigration policies jeopardized any beneficial 
outcomes of the internal market. 
Conversely, the state-centric approach emphasizes a different impetus for 
harmonization. Firstly, the initial commitment to the Single Market‟s integration 
developed before the Single European Act. TREVI provided a security frame into 
which manifold immigration issues were inserted when they entered the political 
agenda in the 1980s.
298
 TREVI focused on a factual understanding of migration as 
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a security issue and, as early as the 1970s, linked security concerns and migration 
as closely related constituents. Interestingly, as mentioned above, immigration in 
the 1990s and the 2000s was linked with criminality and security threat. Because 
TREVI pinpointed the immigration-security concern paradigm before policy 
developments in the European Community, one may argue that the 
intergovernmental cooperation began to underline possible threats of uncontrolled 
international migration in an interstate, joint manner.  
In a sense, the TREVI‟s objectives of a mutual combat against terrorism 
among the EC member states had “intergovernmentally” dispersed to areas of 
migration and border controls in a gradual process, long before the Single 
Market‟s proposals. In addition, Schengen sought to attain a speedier movement 
across frontier-free Europe. Both agreements indirectly brought up the need for 
the harmonized migration issues before the Single European Act. Therefore, 
skeptics of the “spillover” effect highlight the nature of both TREVI and 
Schengen as a way to demonstrate that “it is rather difficult to argue that the 
Single Market integration alone caused this co-operation, which had begun to 
develop prior to the SEA and was linked to attempts to consolidate control over 
international migration in the face of some domestic constraints.”
299
  
Guiraudon argues that developing awareness of legal and political 
constraints in France, Germany and the Netherlands led to a search for new 
European venues for policy development that were more shielded from these 






 In a sense, the market integration increased the salience 
of immigration concerns, but not caused them.
301
 Analysis of the Franco-German 
initiative and its political will, which presumably initiated the European migration 
regime, posed an alarming challenge to the “spillover” logic. According to Herz, 
every step of economic and political integration has been made by the states 
involved.
302
 To further confront the notion of the neofunctionalist approach, 
intergovernmental cooperation was noticed in the vetoes of Britain and Ireland to 
create a Community policy for immigration in the Single European Act.
303
 Had 
the “spillover” mechanism motivated the migration cooperation in the mid-1980s, 
all member states would have followed the “common” immigration policy 
rhetoric. However, British and Irish vetoes and certain member states‟ resistance 
to the European Commission‟s pro-integration White Paper illustrated difficulties 
with mechanistic neofunctionalism.
304
 With respect to the timing of European 
cooperation, Guiraudon finds neofunctionalism as an inadequate analytical tool 
and posed questions whether “spillover” truly directed the immigration 
harmonization in the 1980s. She argues that if “spillover” in fact played a decisive 
role in migration integration, it should have derived from earlier integration 
efforts.
305
 It would have stemmed from integration efforts of the free movement 
of labor, introduced as early as in the 1960s. Although, as mentioned above, Lu 
asserts that the member states‟ cooperation in the migration area spilled over from 
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the call for the free movement of labor and was finalized with the internal market 
proposals. This argument is rather weak due to the considerable time gap from the 
reference to the freedom of workers‟ movement in the late 1950s to its 
formalization in the texts of the SEA. Additionally, British opt out from the 
legally-binding immigration policy development weakens the practicability of 
neofunctionalism. The European Commission took a back seat in these matters, 




Moreover, the recessions of the 1970s and the 1980s had created socio-
economic, domestic distresses. Despite of new political incentives for the member 
states to crack down on illegal immigration, the influx of foreigners continued 
through family reunification, political asylum, and cheap labor.
307
 As many state-
centric scholars argue, the inability to solve the problem of a growing number of 
immigrants and asylum seekers in the EC had served as a key factor for increased 
cooperation among the member states.
308
 The common problem of the 1980s 
engendered centrifugal tendencies among domestic groups for mutual resolution. 
Because of lack of incapacity to handle them unilaterally, joint socio-political 
issues at the domestic level, instead of “spillover” from economic integration and 
the SEA, pushed for the interstate harmonization of immigration-related policies. 
Intergovernmentalist Challenge to Supranationalism 
As an institutionalist would argue, supranationalism has substantially 
accredited a rhetoric, which says that the establishment of international 
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institutions centralizes power in the hands of supranational officials whose 
political entrepreneurship promotes integration.
309
 The gradual 
supranationalization of a certain policy area, like immigration, leads to further 
empowering of the EU institutions. As I referenced above, the development of a 
“common” immigration policy has followed an incremental movement toward 
supranationalization in terms of empowerment of EU officials and policymakers.  
However, such a gradual and limited harmonization may not necessarily 
indicate supranationalization. Some scholars point to a strong intergovernmental 
pattern noticeable in the harmonization process. National governments and the 
European Council have in fact overly influenced outcomes of treaty-amending 
negotiations, by outlining their priorities and deciding on proposals. Some 
scholars, including Moravcsik, attribute decisive powers of multilateral 
negotiations (treaties) to national governments, as opposed to informal 
technocrats. For example, during compromises leading to the Treaty of the 
European Union, governments and national groups drafted detailed proposals of 
the document. Moravcsik shows through empirical analysis that the European 




In the case of the Single European Act‟s negotiations, Moravcsik points 
out that the European Commission and the European Parliament had influenced 
the turn of the final draft of the SEA. However, their role in mediating was very 
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 To the contrary, Moravcsik demonstrates the entrepreneurship of EC 
officials as futile and redundant, and even sometimes counterproductive.
312
 The 
role of the legendary EC figures, including Jean Monnet, has been exaggerated by 
attributing leadership powers to them. Moravcsik states that negotiations initiated 
by national governments were efficient, while interventions of the EC institutions 
were minimally helpful.
313
 The scholar tests several treaty-amending decisions 
and concludes that supranational actors did not enjoy formal powers and their 
presence was an “unintended coincidence” in negotiations.
314
 In this case, Haas 
and Lindberg‟s argument that the Community institutions have been powerful 
“midwives” in multilateral negotiations
315
 runs counter to the state-centric 
approach. Similarly, Moravcsik‟s observations neglect Sandholtz‟s view of the 
EU institutions as players in defining paths of political influence. 
316
  
With respect to domestic preferences, Moravcsik emphasizes the role of 
“imperatives for global economic competitiveness, pressures from national export 
industries, Margaret Thatcher‟s economic liberalism, Francois Mitterrand‟s failed 
socialism in France and Helmut Kohl‟s acquiescence in the Single Market.”
317
 In 
other words, the scholar accredits economic (self) interest as the driving force of 
cooperation and power delegation.
318
 Moravcsik and Kalypso Nicolaidis 
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emphasize that activity of the supranational actors does not infer influence.
319
 
Numerous Commission proposals in the 1980s, the 1990s and the 2000s had 
outlined ambitious objectives, many of which were oriented toward integration 
and the extended rights of migrants. As already referenced, Herz argues that the 
member states in the European Council of Ministers who have favored more 
restrictive and exclusive policies, rebuked majority of these liberal 
communications.
320
 The sole power of influence and manipulation, Moravcsik 
argues, has not affected the outcomes of the treaties. Due to still-present 
unanimity in the majority of the immigration issues, fairly liberal proposals by the 
European Commission have been lowered down during negotiations in the 
European Council of Ministers.
321
 The inability to attain qualified majority voting 
in the European Council of Ministers, outlined as early as in the Treaty of 
Amsterdam, has revealed persisting reluctance of some member states to cede 
more sovereignty over the immigration issues.  
 The extended role of the EU institutions in the policy initiation and the 
European Parliament‟s co-decision gave teeth to the further creation of an 
envisioned “common” immigration policy. To question applicability of the theory 
of supranationalism, many scholars have argued that the immigration policy 
development has followed a purely intergovernmental pattern, where 
empowerment of the EU institutions has not necessarily enhanced their role as 
initiators, mobilizers and mediators. The member states have, in fact, used the EU 
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as a venue to pursue their state interests. Pooling and delegation of power to the 
centralized institutions has aided the countries in reaching a superior outcome by 
reducing the transaction costs.
322
 FRONTEX is an excellent example. Albeit not a 
supranational institution, but rather an independent agency, FRONTEX could be 
acclaimed as a successful leap forward with respect to collective, harmonized 
cooperation on external border issues. However, this independent body has very 
limited control over surveillance of national external borders, which stays with the 
member states. 
The Treaty of Lisbon did not fully “supranationalize” immigration 
policies. While it reaffirmed qualified majority voting in the European Council of 
Ministers and co-decision in the European Parliament, it kept the area of freedom, 
security and justice under shared competence between the European Union and 
the member states. The EU did not gain exclusive competence over such sensitive 
matters. Moreover, Article 63A (5) of the Treaty states “this Article shall not 
affect the right of Member States to determine volume of admission of third-
country nationals coming from third countries to their territory in order to seek 
work, whether employed or self-employed.”
323
 Therefore the member states 
continue to pursue interest in maintaining the immigration quotas, regardless of 
their effect.
324
 The EU would neither fix quotas nor grant right of admission to 
foreign workers. Additionally, the Treaty of Lisbon did not prohibit the EU 
member states from entering into agreements outside of the EU framework. If 
issues related to migration endanger national security, the European Council of 
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Ministers, the European Commission and the European Parliament have no right 
in decision making procedure. As in the previous treaties, Britain and Ireland 
gained sole right to opt in or opt out in decisions in the area of freedom, security 
and justice. This flexibility has undermined the complete communitarization of 
immigration policies. Thus the gradual, yet limited, supranationalization of the 
immigration policy framework raises questions of whether the EU experience has 
followed footsteps of supranationalism, intergovernentalism or perhaps a hybrid 
of both. 
Applicability of Liberal Intergovernmentalism – Spain as a Case Study 
 The major assumption of liberal intergovernmentalism is that integration 
serves as an outcome of international bargaining with governments as the main 
actors. Contrary to the neofunctionalist and supranationalist arguments, 
intergovernmentalist scholars argue that national governments initiate, mediate 
and mobilize negotiations. Liberal intergovernmentalism explains the 
communitarization of immigration policies through processes of Spain‟s national 
preference formation, interstate bargaining and institutional choice. This state-
level approach provides the empirical evidence of how a member state, through 
active advocacy, has influenced creation of the immigration regime at the EU 
level. Even though Moravcsik uses his approach to describe official negotiations 
between the member states, this section nonetheless looks at Spain‟s ongoing 
push for a “common” immigration policy, in a bottom-up manner. In a way, the 
Spanish government‟s support for a unified policy could be considered as a 
negotiation with other member states and EU officials. Additionally, I limit the 
118 
chronological scope of this section to the sole time period of the last decade 
(2000-2010). As I illustrate above, Spain officially began to advocate for a 
“common” immigration policy in the late 1990s, thus the liberal 
intergovernmentalist approach mainly deals with the first decade of the 2000s. 
National Preference Formation 
 Moravcsik‟s theory of liberal intergovernmentalism emphasizes that 
national preferences shape state‟s behavior in international politics. As 
intergovernmentalists assert, the state is a major player. However, in reality, the 
state is not an actor in itself, but a representative institution for national 
preferences. These preferences are developed by social and private groups who 
seek to promote differentiated interests.
325
 Groups or institutions, including 
employers, trade unions, civil rights associations, and the Catholic Church, voice 
their demands, which then exert influence on politicians and are fulfilled by 
governments. Why do national governments accept the role as “transmission 
belts”?
326
 Moravcsik inclines to the view that governments in power want to be 
re-elected or are captured by the presented issues.
327
 As governments‟ actions 
revolve around self- interest, their preferences still depend on the preferences of 
social actors.
328
 Although Moravcsik does not attribute the voting public as an 
influential social actor, there is a need to see unorganized civil society as an 
important tool in national preference formation. The focus on the Spanish 
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immigration laws cannot neglect the voting public‟s concern with the issue, as it 
is turned into demands for toughened immigration stance.  
National preference formation finds applicability in the development of 
Spanish domestic demands concerning uncontrolled immigration. Spain entered 
the decade of 1990s as a new immigration state. This period could be explained as 
an intermediate one from the low to the high magnitude of migration issues 
among political and social actors in the immigration area. Players who seemed to 
influence administrative actions of the government were mainly the employers 
who favored regularization programs as a tool to fight with labor shortages,
329
 
hence the acts of 1991 and 1996. Spanish labor unions supported legal 
immigration over illegal and thus promoted amnesties, family reunification and 
employment-based migration quotas.
330
 Focus on immigrant integration grew 
among the public and civil rights actors. As I discuss below, the Spanish 
government‟s stance on the fight against illegal immigration became pronounced 
during the Barcelona Conference of 1995. Moreover, the late 1990s and the 2000s 
witnessed significant socio-economic events that decisively impacted public 
opinion and furthered the government‟s stance on illegal immigration. 
Undoubtedly, the 2000s decade had shown national preference formation. Ever 
since, the voting public and politicians have become the major players in shaping 
policies in this particular field.  
 As I already referenced, El Ejido became a scene of collective conflict 
with political and social consequences. This event can be seen as an initiative to 
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shape national preferences, overwhelmingly based on the voting public. It is 
important to mention that people‟s negative opinion on illegal immigration has 
been greatly influenced by right-wing media coverage and political campaigning. 
Immigrants became defined not only as foreigners, but also as criminals. The 
public, infuriated by a criminal act in El Ejido, became a target of media-fed anti-
immigration propaganda. Right-wing politicians shaped their approach to the 
event based on the dominant attitudes and views of the public. After the incident, 
Juan Enciso, mayor of El Ejido and a member of the Partido Popular, supported 
violent acts of Spaniards against immigrants. Enciso emphasized that the PP stood 
for the Spanish people (the voters); consensus would thus mean heightened 
support for the PP.
331
 
 El Ejido became a politicized playing field through which the opposition 
party not only aimed to fulfill national preferences for restrictive immigration, but 
also to secure its own self-interest of being elected. The PP won the March 2000 
elections with an increase of six percent on results from 1996 to 2000.
332
 
Table 6 – Electoral gain of the Partido Popular in 2000 (as compared to 1996) 








El Ejido 46.2% 63.6% +17.4% 
Spain 38.6% 44.2% +5.6% 
 
Source: Zapata-Barrero, “Spanish Challenges,” 252. 
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 As the table shows, citizens expressed their support for the PP, which targeted 
increasing insecurity and delinquency.
333
 In other words, the public‟s fear of 
augmenting crime among immigrants was projected on the decisions undertaken 
by the government. I could argue that El Ejido sped up the Spanish government‟s 
push for the forthcoming restrictive immigration law in Spain. Its objectives to 
tighten up external border controls and to fight against undocumented immigrants 
already found agreement with EU demands.  
 Other external and internal factors that stimulated negative attitudes of the 
population were the “9/11” terrorist attacks, the Madrid bombings in 2004,the  
Ceuta and Melilla events in 2005 and the London bombing in 2005. Playing on 
fears generated by the “9/11,” former Prime Minister Aznar declared, 
“Immigration and terrorism not properly dealt with have generated radicalism.”
334
 
Similarly to “9/11,” the terrorist attack from March 11, 2004, near Atocha railway 
station in Madrid, turned the world‟s eyes on the Spanish capital.
335
 Even though 
not all suspects of the attack were illegal immigrants, this terrible event, which 
left 191 casualties, became highly politicized by the Spanish government in order 
to legitimize further securitization of immigration politics.  Moreover, the media 
focus on Ceuta and Melilla amplified in September and October 2005, when 
several hundred sub-Saharan African migrants attacked the border of the 
enclaves. This act led to the death of more than a dozen migrants who desperately 
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searched a more prosperous life.
336
 It further cultivated the widening gap between 
“us” and “others” within the Spanish society.  
 The recent economic crisis has also attributed to national preference 
formation due to the rise of unemployment among both Spaniards and 
immigrants. The official 20 percent unemployment figure has frightened 
concerned politicians and the public.
337
 During a recession, employers curtail 
search for cheap labor, and civil rights groups are not strong enough to lobby for 
more expansive immigration policies. Theoretically, the costs of immigration 
become more pronounced and include a drain of the social security system.
338
 
Immigrants are seen as scapegoats, targeted by the public, media, and politicians. 
Despite Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero‟s long proclaimed support 
for equal social rights for immigrants, the recent LO 2/2009 is, in fact, the latest 
attempt by the socialist government to assuage the growing discontent in a society 
hurt by the economic crisis.
339
   
Interstate Bargaining 
Another step in Spain‟s negotiations for a “common” immigration policy 
is interstate bargaining. Moravcsik‟s three-part model of EU negotiations 
specifically focuses on Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs), which lead to 
treaty amendments. Interstate bargaining refers to agreements and compromises 
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gained at such meetings. Closa and Heywood devote a chapter of their book, 
entitled Shaping the Union and Defending National Interests, on the Spain‟s 
intergovernmentalist approach to policymaking at the EU level.
340
 One of the 
dimensions through which Spain has pursued its national interests at the EU level 
is IGCs and enlargement negotiations. Similarly to Moravcsik‟s argument, the 
Spanish government has used such official gatherings as a way to secure its 
standpoint on various issues. With respect to the Justice and Home Affairs, Spain 
played a very active role during the Treaty of Amsterdam‟s negotiations in 1996. 
For instance, its negotiators stressed the need to “communitarize” the third pillar 
and to incorporate the Schengen Agreements into the Treaty of Amsterdam.
341
 
As the member states defend their national interests at the IGCs, a study of 
a country‟s cooperation with the other EU member states and of numerous 
agreements outside of the IGC realm can also yield outcomes lined with liberal 
intergovernmentalism. Assumingly, when national preference formation creates a 
majority consensus among the domestic actors, the Spanish government may 
proceed and pursue a policy based on a consensus at the intergovernmental level. 
Negotiations depend on relative power of the states involved.
342
 The pattern of 
policy interdependence becomes a crucial instrument. As Moravcsik argues, “the 
power of each government is inversely proportional to the relative value it places 
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on an argument compared to the outcome of its best alternative.”
343
 If a 
government wants to achieve something, it is willing to compromise.
344
 
 There is no doubt that the Spanish government and the political parties (on 
left and right of the ideological spectrum) have heavily depended on agreements 
and mutual cooperation, which address border controls and illegal immigration. 
Its geographical location and historical/cultural links to sending countries have 
shaped attitudes of other EU member states as facilitators in the fight against 
unwanted immigration. Spain‟s position as a gatekeeper has made it more 
vulnerable to favorable agreements reached with other states, mainly France or 
other Mediterranean countries. One of the main arguments that the Spanish 
government has used is that immigration is not a Spanish problem, but a European 
one. The southern borders of Spain are no longer national borders; they are also 
European frontiers.  
 Closa and Heywood‟s second dimension of pursuit of national interests is 
the use of the EU Presidency to steer policies in a particular dimension.
345
 As 
already emphasized, the Spanish Presidency of the European Council of Ministers 
in 2002 underscored the Partido Popular‟s stance on a “common” immigration 
policy with the emphasis on combating terrorism and illegal immigration and 
fortifying border controls. Many can observe the conservative government‟s 
success in promoting a restrictive stance on the “common” immigration policy 
regime. Prime Minister Aznar and Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi 
formed a coalition at the Seville Summit against “permissive” immigration 
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proposals of their EU neighbors.
346
 The officials favored restrictive immigration 
measures that targeted undocumented foreigners, living in Spain and Italy 
illegally. Being of vulnerable geographical locations, both member states have 
endorsed the “common” immigration policy rhetoric based on their national 
interests. 
 Albeit not referenced in this research work, Closa and Heywood‟s third 
dimension refers to “insider policies” - placing nationals in key positions in 
Brussels in order to shape policies from the inside. Such a venue to influence 
national interests is incorporated into Moravcsik‟s interstate bargaining part due 
to national representatives‟ role as middle men in intergovernmental negotiations. 
The Spanish government, in relation to its advocacy for a “common” immigration 
policy, does not solely constitute a body of politicians and bureaucratic 
administration within national borders. It also includes personnel hired by the 
Permanent Representation (REPER) in Brussels, European Commission 
employees, and national officials in top ranking positions. As Closa and Heywood 
add, “presence in EU institutions does not necessarily equate to real influence- 
although it is likely that control over top positions helps to exert some influence 
on those areas which are deemed sensitive issues for Spain.”
347
  
 Moreover, Spain‟s bargaining power was in the spot light at the informal 
meeting of the EU heads of state or government in Lahti, Finland, in October 
2006. Zapatero urged fellow EU leaders to finance boats, planes and money in 
order to help the Mediterranean countries to deal with the influx of undocumented 
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immigrants from Africa. According to the Prime Minister, a growing problem 
with uncontrolled migration has drained the Spanish government‟s resources.
348
 
While some EU member states showed their willingness to support Spain, others 
voiced their discontent, blaming Spain for using the EU and its member states as a 
venue to fulfill its domestic goals.  
 Spain has also undertaken bilateral agreements with other EU member 
states (i.e. Italy and France) in order to strengthen its position in a battle against 
uncontrolled inflow of immigrants. As an outcome, the country has effectively 
persuaded many states that a unilateral approach is impotent in resolving an 
immigration problem. Spain‟s nearly desperate position in dealing with illegal 
migration issues at the domestic level puts it in a situation of willing to 
compromise certain interests in order to distribute the burden among other 
participating states. Henceforth, if a “common” immigration policy becomes 
finalized, Spain may find itself in a deadlock position with respect to its 
legalization acts, despite executive competence of national states over 
regularization programs. European politicians from Austria, the Netherlands and 
Germany voiced their discontentment to the Spanish government for performing 
the large-scale regularization program in 2005.
349
 Previous processes also fell 
under a spell of voluminous criticism at the national and international levels.  
Unlike the United Kingdom and Ireland, Spain has supported the full 
harmonization of immigration policies at the expense of its veto power. Spanish 
legislators clearly have understood the potential cost of instituting the legally-
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binding policy. The European Parliament would gain co-decision; the Council of 
Ministers would have the power of qualified majority voting. Such a compromise 
is worthwhile if Spain is to receive financial aid and effectively influence EU 
objectives with its domestic interests. 
Institutional Choice 
 The central institutional choice in the EU is whether and how to pool and 
delegate sovereignty to the EU level. Pooling refers to the application of majority 
decisions in the European Council of Ministers; delegation concerns the powers 
given to the European Commission and the European Court of Justice.
350
 
According to Moravcsik‟s conclusions, states pool and delegate sovereignty to 
obtain more credible commitments. Spain is a part of a group of European states 
that have viewed this institutional choice for the immigration regime as a 
guarantee to future decisions, cooperation and improved implementation of 
agreements.
351
 Spain‟s active participation in the construction of a “common” 
immigration policy officially dates back to its 2002 EU Presidency.
352
 Ever since, 




The socio-economic issues of the 2000s not only mobilized the formation 
of national preferences, but also led to the realization that national and bilateral 
controls over external borders and illegal immigration are unfeasible. Both the 
Partido Popular (early 2000s) and the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (2004 
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onward) pursued the communitarization of policies not only to get more credible 
commitments, but also for economic interests at the national level. The Spanish 
government has advertised illegal immigration as not just a Spanish problem, but 
also a European one. While the 1980s and the 1990s were characterized by the 
unfolding EU‟s pressure on Spain to control its external border, recently it is 
Spain who has pushed the EU to acknowledge reinforcement of external border 
controls as a European task.
354
 Spain‟s inability to solitarily deal with 
undocumented immigrants leaves no other option but to turn to Europe for 
financial and material resources. As I already stated, the EU has served as a 
supplementary aid to the member states.
355
 Additionally, the Spanish government 
has emphasized immigration as an EU problem mainly as an effective venue to 
distribute the immigration burden across the EU member states. It has also called 
for joint EU operations in the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic coast of Africa, 
especially after the 2005 Ceuta and Melilla crisis.
356
 The latter event decisively 
influenced Spain‟s active role in the drafting of the Global Approach in 2005. 
 It is important to mention that Spain‟s advocacy for strengthened external 
policy dates back to the 1990s. In 1995, former Spanish foreign minister Javier 
Solana organized the Barcelona Conference, which gathered ministers for foreign 
affairs from 15 EU member states and 12 non-EU member countries, mainly from 
North Africa.
357
 The EU incorporated the ten-year program of the Barcelona 
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Declaration, often referred to as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, as a major 
external policy of the EU.
 358
  
The Barcelona Process was initiated to address Europe‟s concerns and 
challenges faced with its back-door neighbors in the Mediterranean basin. Its 
work program focused on a myriad of issues, including “cooperation in the field 
of illegal immigration, the fight against terrorism, drug trafficking, international 
crime and corruption.”
359
 Many have declared the ten-year initiative as mainly 
ineffective due to its failure to meet the outlined agenda. The “9/11” incidents and 
the subsequent terrorist attacks in Europe diverged economic development and 
prosperity to national security.
360
 In 2008, French President Sarkozy re-launched 
the Barcelona Process under the new name of the Union for the Mediterranean. 
Thus far, the latter program has aimed at promoting stability throughout the 
Mediterranean region.  
According to Joslyn R.Q. Osten‟s conclusions, the Barcelona Process was 
an initiative based on Moravcsik‟s assumption that “each state seeks to realize its 
distinctive preferences under varying constraints imposed by the preferences of 
other states.”
361
 Therefore, Spain and its Southern European counterparts saw the 
Barcelona Process as a venue to alleviate national issues, supporting Moravcsik‟s 
system of institutional choice. 
To sum up, the EU member states have approved restrictive 
communitarization of highly-contested issues in order to enhance national control 
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 As seen, the Spanish government has advocated pooling and 
delegation for such reasons as mutual commitments, financial benefits, fulfillment 
of domestic demands by application of EU restrictive objectives, and gradual 
projection of its domestic policies onto the EU level. In a sense, the financially- 
based reasons behind advocacy have aimed at enhancing national control and 
sovereignty over immigration.  
Furthermore, if a “common” immigration policy is implemented at the EU 
level, Spain will not only introduce minor changes to its legal framework, but it 
will attain its goal of restrictive stance on illegal immigration and external border 
controls. Pooling and delegation of sovereignty would represent more of a 
reinforcement and redefinition of the state‟s control over immigration issues. 
Therefore, national sovereignty would not be fully eroded. To the contrary, Spain 
would strengthen its domestic control by circumventing institutional constraints. 
Legislators in support of more restrictive policies will be able to address the EU 
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Chapter 6: Analytical Conclusions 
 
 
Neofunctionalism, supranationalism and (liberal) intergovernmentalism 
have left a mark on our understanding of over a half-a-century-long European 
integration. The study of European integration would be far from advanced 
without their theoretical contribution. After examining the historical evolution of 
a “common” immigration policy at the EU level and the simultaneously evolving 
Spanish immigration laws, a number of interpretations emerge from my analysis.  
 To briefly summarize, neofunctionalists accredit the Single European Act 
as a precursor to the harmonization of immigration policies at the EU level. 
Functional “spillover” from the creation of the Single Market into the “common” 
immigration policy rhetoric likely initiated years of cooperative development of 
the single migration regime. Like intergovernmentalists, neofunctionalists assert 
that once the member states understood the costs of non-EC immigration policies, 
they began to lobby for a harmonized regime, targeting external border controls 
and restrictive legislations against illegal migrants. Neofunctionalists accredit 
functional “spillover,” whereas the state-centric students praise interstate 
cooperation (mainly the Franco-German partnership) as an impetus of the 
immigration harmonization. Basing my analyses on secondary texts and empirical 
evidence, I argue that the political power behind French and German cooperation 
in the 1980s markedly influenced the harmonization of the migratory regime. 
 Initial commitment to the Single Market developed before implementation 
of the Single European Act‟s text. The intergovernmental TREVI provided a 
security frame into which migration issues as inserted when they entered the 
132 
political agenda in the 1980s.
363
 The TREVI‟s objectives of combating terrorism 
among the European governments had influenced the areas of illegal immigration 
and border controls in a gradual process, long before the Single Market proposals. 
After TREVI, the Schengen Agreements were concluded outside of the 
framework of the European Community. Both agreements indirectly referenced 
the need to harmonize migration policies before the implementation of the SEA. 
The two heads of state, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and French president 
François Mitterrand, actively promoted the project.
364
As Douglas Webber also 
states, "It was the French and German governments‟ decision to dismantle the 
reciprocal border controls, reached at Saarbrücken in 1984, that paved the way for 
the adoption of the Schengen Accord less than a year later."
365
  
Although the Franco-German political and economic interests are not a 
cornerstone of my argument, it is noteworthy that the outcome of such a close 
collaboration, along with other Northern European states, has weakened the 
position of the neofunctionalist theory as a viable explanation to the initiation of 
the harmonization process of immigration policies. As a matter of fact, I identify 
the first Spanish immigration law, LO 7/1985, and its timing as a crucial key. In 
reality, the so-called EC pressure on the Spanish government to implement 
restrictive policies clearly embedded Franco-German interests. As LO 7/1985 
closely aligned with Schengen objectives, it calmed Northern European states' 
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fears of a potential, sudden chaos fueled by incoming immigrants, who would use 
Spain as a convenient gateway. Even though Spain was not yet a part of Schengen 
in 1985, France, Germany and the Benelux countries aspired to influence the 
Southern country's immigration policies for future security benefits, regardless of 
the law's inadequacy with Spain‟s domestic demands. I can thus argue that 
national interests of the member states, as noticeable in interstate cooperation, 
serve as a more plausible explanation than a coincidental “spill over” from 
economic integration (the Single Market) to political integration. Moreover, 
British and Irish opt out from the Schengen Agreements and from a further 
harmonization accredits the powerful role of the state. I am inclined to the view 
that (liberal) intergovernmentalism is a more likely explanation of the initiation of 
the European immigration policy regime. It is impossible to escape the prevalent 
importance of the states as political players in the domain of European 
integration. 
 With regards to supranationalism, it would be fallacious to state that the 
EU member states have not moved toward the communitarization of the migration 
regime. According to the above examined legal documents, the unification of 
immigration policies has followed a very slow and gradual route. Only since the 
Treaty of Lisbon have the member states released more powers to the EU 
institutions. The most recent treaty could be seen as a culminating act in the 
creation of a “common” immigration policy. However, it is noticeable that a 
moderate movement toward the final objective has unfolded in an 
intergovernmental fashion. The states have continued to be the major players with 
134 
shared knowledge, problems, and identities, for which they have constructed 
European solutions. Such a dense cooperation of governments at various levels 
has opened doors to further policy implementation in a much smoother manner.
366
 
As Moravcsik argues, the European Union is a series of intergovernmental 
negotiations.
367
 In support of the latter argument, Moravcsik describes the Single 
European Act as a union of elites between EU officials and the European business 
interest groups. Its negotiating history is more consistent with an explanation that 
the EU reform rested on interstate bargains between the Community‟s 
superpowers: the United Kingdom, France and Germany.
368
 
The gradual harmonization of the immigration regime can be understood 
through scrutiny of countries that have been capable of achieving goals via 
intergovernmental negotiations and bargaining, rather than via a central authority 
in charge of making and enforcing decisions.
369
 Pooling and delegation of control 
to the supranational institutions helps states to reach a superior outcome by 
reducing transaction costs. Additionally, domestic actors who benefit from 
common policies and consensus have favored such an institutional choice.
370
  
 In my opinion, the theory of supranationalism partially explains the 
process of the development of a “common” immigration policy. Unlike 
supranationalists, I argue that the EU institutions are not the major powerhouses 
of European integration. Instead, I would accredit the states as the leaders in 
deciding upon the degree of further cooperation. Therefore, a “common” 
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 Moravcsik, The Choice of Europe, 74. 
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immigration policy would not necessarily resemble a pure state of 
supranationalism per se; rather, it would reflect incomplete supranationalization, 
with strong intergovernmentalist characteristics. This statement leads me to 
incorporate Lahav‟s argument that a hybrid of supranationalism and 




 The prevailing goal of national governments does not have to be 
protection of sovereignty at all times. As Donald J. Puchala emphasizes, 
"European governments by and large favor European integration, and they are 
certainly less preoccupied with sovereignty than they are interested in deriving 
benefits from international collaboration."
372
  The latter argument supports 
Moravcsik's third part of the EU negotiations scheme - institutional choice. 
National governments benefit more from pooling and delegation of decisions to 
the EU level, assuring that such decisions would reflect their interests.
 Presumably, if a “common” immigration policy becomes constituted, the 
role of the state will diminish at the expense of increasing importance of the 
European Commission and the European Parliament. However, the states will 
continue to have decisive impact on this issue. Puchala's comment perfectly 
portrays this EU-member state symbiotic relationship: 
 the governing of Europe, most of which already is or predictably 
will be within the EU, has a great deal to do with the functioning 
of the EU institutions. But the origins of this governance and its 
future evolution certainly have much to do with the explicit interest 
of Member States, their initiatives and influence and asymmetries 
in power among them. If Europe is still the 'bag o marbles' that 
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Andrew Shonfield likened many years ago, the bag has over the 
time become increasingly important and the individual marbles 





The Spanish government has actively and successfully influenced the EU 
framework with national interests. While in the mid-1990s it was the EU who 
pressed Spain for enforced external border surveillance, it is currently Spain who 
has promoted tightened frontier controls since its “Plan Sur” and SIVE enactment. 
The country developed its national approach into a mainstream European 
problem,
374
 fulfilling its domestic (economic) demands. The 2010 Spanish 
Presidency of the European Council of Ministers urged for more financial 
resources, clearer rules and specialist offices for FRONTEX.
375
 Spain, as one of 
the Shonfield‟s marbles in the bag, has blatantly emphasized its geographical 
position and thus its opinion has considerably contributed to the construction of a 
“common” immigration policy.  
 I have examined the case study of Spain through the prism of liberal 
intergovernmentalism. As I already stated, Moravcsik‟s three-tier scheme 
concentrates on official negotiations, such as Intergovernmental Conferences 
(IGCs). However, I distance myself from this approach and introduce his method 
within the lines of the Spanish government and its relation to other national, 
international and supranational players. As I already demonstrated, national 
preference formation, interstate bargaining, and institutional choice are 
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mechanisms present at national and international levels in periods between treaty 
negotiations. Moravcsik is right in insisting that the treaties are building blocks of 
the European Union and treaty amending documents are usually induced by well-
defined national preferences. Such preferences are nurtured over time. Internal 
issues, especially socio-economic and political, are necessary to shape 
government‟s preferences, which are then discussed and bargained via the 
interstate manner, and eventually pushed in a bottom-up way to the EU level.  
With respect to national preferences, I argue that liberal 
intergovernmentalism does find (perhaps partial) applicability to the case study of 
Spain and its immigration law evolution. I include the word "partial" because I 
have taken the voting public into consideration. Citizens are often the architects as 
to who influences governmental decisions. In a democratic country like Spain, the 
people vote for politicians, who promise to satisfy some of the public's 
expectations solely for re-electoral benefits. In the case of illegal immigration and 
external border controls, the government in power has not only fulfilled some of 
the public concerns, but also awarded itself with economic self-interest.  
 Moravcsik would agree that interstate cooperation leads to economic gains 
at the national level. As I remarked, one of the reasons for pooling and delegation 
of sovereignty has been an economic gain of financial support to fight 
uncontrolled immigration. Moravcsik writes, "When domestic policy instruments 
remain effective, governments will continue to maintain them; but where 
governments have exhausted all cost-effective domestic means of achieving 




 In this sense, the Spanish government has not been able to deal 
with such a large number of illegal (and legal) immigrants with respect to social 
services costs, deportation, surveillance of border controls, etc. Therefore, joint 
gains (economic cooperation and financial aid) and expected utility (more 
restrictive policies envisaged by the EU) have been high.  
I agree with Ramin Shafagatov and Aygun Mirzayeva who infer that 
liberal intergovernmentalist theory fits well the explanation of the process of the 
development of a “common” immigration policy because domestic political 
factors and national governments play a decisive role in its development.
377
 That 
said, Givens and Luedtke argue that when the political salience is high (like in the 
case of immigration issues), national governments either block harmonization, or 
allow only a restrictive pathway of harmonization at the EU level.
378
 Schain 
makes a similar observation. He asserts that, although the progress has been 
noticeable with regards to the fight against illegal immigration and border control, 
failure to harmonize immigration policies stems from the fact that if cooperation 
takes place, it tends to support control and exclusion, rather than expansion and 
harmonization. He adds that the emphasis on exclusion and restriction reflects 
preferences of the ministries (of interior and justice) that are in charge of the 
process and that dominate the institutional space.
379
 Therefore, national 
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governments decide on the degree of the policy development at the EU level. 
Liberal intergovernmentalists argue that states pursue domestic preferences (such 
as the harmonization of immigration policies) at the supranational level because it 
serves as an extension of their domestic politics. 
 Therefore, according to my above analyses, paradoxically, 
supranationalism and (liberal) intergovernmentalism are both plausible theories 
applicable to the process of the development of a “common” immigration policy. 
Arguably, the latter framework appears to be the driving motor of a future, unified 
policy. This process of "intergovernmentalist supranationalization," as 
demonstrated at the EU and the national levels, has shown that Spain continues to 
play a leading role in shaping a “common” immigration policy. The EU 
institutions have indeed gained more power over the last decade or so. 
Nevertheless, the nature of the power upgrade has solely depended on decisions 
undertaken by national actors. As Gebbes mentions,  
Member states now share power- that much is clear- but this does 
not mean that their relevance is waning. Instead, EU 
responsibilities provide new international venues for the pursuit of 
policy objectives. Cooperation has thus far tended to strengthen the 




 Examination of the three theories of European integration points to 
different mechanisms, which can be applicable to the explanation of the policy 
creation. According to my observations, initiation of the immigration policy 
harmonization seemed to follow planned interstate cooperation rather than the 
“spillover” process of neofunctionalism. External negotiations and agreements 
had ignited over-two-decades-long movement toward the harmonization of 
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migration policies, thus supporting an argument that intergovernmental talks have 
in fact been powerful tools in igniting the communitarization of the migration 
regime at the European level.    
Supranationalism is a persuasive theory, which, interestingly, appears to 
be a continuation of neofunctionalism. If ever reached, the communitarization of 
immigration policies would ultimately reflect an "intergovernmentalist 
supranationalization," with shared power between the nation states and the EU 
institutions. The establishment of the policy would support supranationalist 
sentiments; however, the real powerhouses - the member state, indisputably 
including Spain – would continue to monitor and direct its development from 
“behind the curtains.”  
Concluding Remarks 
 One can observe that the phenomenon of the European Union and its 
policymaking has bred two camps of nation states: laggards and leaders. Spain, 
with respect to the “common” immigration policy development, has undoubtedly 
been the latter. Through processing and analyzing primary and secondary sources, 
I conclude that, in the late 1990s, Spain has emerged as one of the few major 
voices in the non-monolithic process of shaping a “common” immigration policy. 
By using the EU as an effective arena to resolve domestic issues, the Spanish 
governments (socialist and conservative) have been able to constitute ideas and 
concepts, which are now embedded in the EU immigration rhetoric. The country‟s 
geopolitical location has allowed its central government to edge out as a powerful 
state, which sits behind drafting of a “common” immigration policy along with 
141 
countries like Germany, France, the Netherlands and Belgium. Thanks to 
successful lobbying activities of the Spanish conservative government, 
immigration has become a Europe-wide securitized and criminalized topic. 
 Thus, the development of the “common” immigration policy regime 
supports an “intergovernmentalist supranationalization.” I received affirmative 
results from the application of Moravcsik's liberal intergovernmentalism to the 
case study of Spain. The description of the Spanish regularization programs 
supports an argument that the country has held the steering wheel, thus posing a 
challenge to Sandholtz‟s assertion that the EU institutions are the powerhouses in 
defining paths of political influence.
381
  
 The case study of the Spanish legalization acts has unraveled a limited 
scope of the EU control over the field of illegal immigration. National 
governments secured the power to deal with immigrant statuses at the domestic 
level. As Elizabeth Collett from Migration Policy Institute mentions, early drafts 
of the Stockholm Program had proposed that the European Commission would in 
fact draft a common approach to legalization processes in order to ensure that 
immigrants are treated similarly across the EU.
382
 However, due to a politically 
sensitive issue that this policy area has played, the member states successfully 
safeguarded exclusive competence over this subject. As we observe, Spain took 
advantage of this ongoing privilege and introduced several regularization 
programs since the mid-1980s. Despite discontent voiced by several EU heads of 
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government or state, the Spanish government has so far legalized over one million 
undocumented immigrants in order to address domestic demands.  
 How do these recurring instances apply to the concluding findings? They 
certainly demonstrate that Spain‟s national interests undermine the EU‟s pressure 
in certain areas. The state's importance is once again noticeable when 
rationalizing regularization programs. So far, these countermeasures have 
challenged the EU restrictive objectives despite the fact that the Spanish 
government has recently favored more toughened laws. A potential “common” 
immigration policy would have a limited scope, thus leaving many of its parts 
within exclusive competence of the states.    
Recent Economic Downturn - Challenge? 
 Undoubtedly, the current economic downturn has played a significant role 
in migratory inflows to the European continent. Numerous newspaper headlines 
have confirmed that immigration to Europe has slowed down due to effective 
enforcement of external border patrols and the extensive impact of the economic 
stagnation. I would refrain from absorbing such generalized information at a face 
value. The 2011 Arab revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya have accelerated an 
upsurge of illegal immigration not only into Southern Europe, but also the whole 
old continent. Moreover, the 2010-2011 Greece‟s incident with uncontrolled 
inflow of foreigners (mainly from Turkey) has shown that undocumented 
migrants continue to find effective routes to cross the gates of the prosperous 
world. With regards to a “common” immigration policy, what is the future of the 
unified migration regime? Is it more of a feasible, or an obsolete, goal?  
143 
 According to Demetrios G. Papademetriou et al from the Migration Policy 
Institute, public expectations about immigration‟s impact may become more acute 
due to an economic recession. Undoubtedly, an economic turmoil has a potential 
to fuel anti-immigrant sentiments, which are then harmful to community 
integration.
383
 One can only briefly study public reactions to immigrant 
population residing in the EU to find a grain of truth in the above statement. More 
restrictive measures have also been undertaken by the EU heads of state or 
government (i.e. the Netherlands, Denmark, and France) regarding illegal 
immigration. Emphasis on the costs of immigration is a common tactic; foreigners 
are blamed for draining of the social security system.
384
 Immigrants are turned 
into scapegoats, so easily targeted by the public, media, and politicians. 
 In my opinion, the development of a “common” immigration policy will 
face either one of the two scenarios: ultimately come into effect as a very 
restrictive community law (fighting against illegal immigration, reducing family 
reunification, reducing the number of labor visas, and amplifying external border 
patrols); or stagnate (similarly to the integration slowdown caused by the 1970s 
oil crisis and its economic downturn) and continue to serve as a mere rhetoric, 
postponed for future years to come. In the latter case, the member states will 
continue to exercise control over their national immigration laws, with reluctant 
transposition of any forthcoming EU directives and regulations. It is plausible that 
intergovernmental cooperation would pave the way. 
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